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Research data

Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans

Diekmann, Andreas; Przepiorka, Wojtek
GESIS, Cologne. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909
Abstract: Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a legitimate authority and leaves an unresolved gap in the transition from peer-punishment to centralized punishment. Here we show that the origins of centralized punishment could lie in individuals’ distinct ability to punish defectors. In our laboratory experiment, we vary the struc ... more
Availability: Free access (without registration)
License: CC BY-NC-SA 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de)
Subject area: Organizational Sociology, Military Sociology | Other Fields of Sociology | Economic theory and methodology | Economics | Social Psychology

Methodology

Date(s) of Data Collection: 2014-03-13;2014-03-20
Geographic coverage: Switzerland / CH
Universe: In total, 216 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 57.9% were female and they were 23.1 years old on average (sd = 5.57).
Sampling Procedure: All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experimen ... more
Mode of Data Collection: Laboratory experiment

Bibliographic information

Primärforschende, Institution: Diekmann, Andreas; ETH Zurich | Przepiorka, Wojtek; Utrecht University
Publication year: 2015
Study number: SDN-10.7802-1909
Contributor, Institution, Role: Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University;Contact Person
Publisher: GESIS, Cologne

Versions

Current Version: 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909

Reference publications

Publications: Diekmann, Andreas and Wojtek Przepiorka. 2015. "Punitive Preferences, Monetary Incentives and Tacit Coordination in the Punishment of Defectors Promote Cooperation in Humans." Scientific Reports 5:10321.;10.1038/srep10321

Cite

Diekmann, Andreas, & Przepiorka, Wojtek (2015). Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans. GESIS, Cologne. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909.

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