{"hits":{"total":{"value":1,"relation":"eq"},"hits":[{"_index":"gesis-22-05-2026-02-01-51","_id":"gesis-ssoar-66885","_version":3,"_seq_no":98673,"_primary_term":1,"found":true,"_source":{"title":"Cooperation, trust, security? The potential and limits of the OSCE's economic and environmental dimension","id":"gesis-ssoar-66885","date":"2019","date_recency":"2019","abstract":"In the context of a European security order under pressure, the OSCE - and its long neglected economic and environmental dimension - has developed a new dynamism.The potential for generating trust in this area is attributed to the idea that economics and the environment are supposedly less sensitive issues to cooperate on. The assumption is that this trust can subsequently have a positive effect on cooperation in other fields, and contribute to greater security in Europe as a whole. In this regard, the results of this study suggest that we should manage expectations pragmatically: the chances of cooperation on OSCE \"second-dimension\" issues should be kept in perspective. A greater degree of intergovernmental cooperation does not automatically mean an increase in trust, nor does spillover between \"low politics\" and \"high politics\"\u201d necessarily occur. Alongside its EU partners, Germany should therefore pay particular attention as to how to upgrade the OSCE\u2019s economic and environmental dimension. Connections between the OSCE dimensions should be actively promoted; debates in the \"second dimension\" could be even more closely tied to the discussion on the crumbling basic consensus over rule-based order and common principles. (author's abstract)","portal_url":"https:\/\/www.ssoar.info\/ssoar\/handle\/document\/66885","type":"publication","topic":["OSZE","wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit","internationale Zusammenarbeit","Umweltpolitik","Sicherheitspolitik","internationale Beziehungen","Milit\u00e4r","Konfliktregelung","Krisenmanagement"],"person":["Smolnik, Franziska"],"person_sort":"Smolnik","links":[{"label":"URN","link":"http:\/\/nbn-resolving.de\/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66885-6"},{"label":"DOI","link":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.18449\/2019RP16"}],"document_type":"Forschungsbericht","institutions":["SWP"],"coreAuthor":["Smolnik, Franziska"],"coreSjahr":"2019","coreZsband":"16\/2019","publishLocation_str_mv":"Berlin","coreLanguage":"en","doi":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.18449\/2019RP16","urn":"urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66885-6","coreIssn":"1863-1053","data_source":"GESIS-SSOAR","index_source":"GESIS-SSOAR","database":"SSOAR - Social Science Open Access Repository","link_count":0,"gesis_own":1,"fulltext":1,"metadata_quality":10,"full_text":"                                     SWP   Research Paper   Cooperation, Trust, Franziska Smolnik   Security?   The Potential   and Limits of the OSCE o s Economic and  Environmental Dimension       Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik  German Institute for  International and Security Affairs  SWPDecember 2019 Research Paper, Berlin 16        Abstract  \u05d6   In the context of a European security order under pressure, the OSCE V   and its long neglected economic and environmental dimension V  has  developed a new dynamism.  \u05d6   The potential for generating trust in this area is attributed to the idea that  economics and the environment are supposedly less sensitive issues to  cooperate on. The assumption is that this trust can subsequently have a  positive effect on cooperation in other fields, and contribute to greater  security in Europe as a whole.  \u05d6   In this regard, the results of this study suggest that we should manage  expectations pragmatically: the chances of cooperation on OSCE pUGNQP\u0143 \u0143OOGPUOQPq\u0002OUUPGU\u0002 should be kept in perspective.  \u05d6   A greater degree of intergovernmental cooperation does not automatically  mean an increase in trust, nor does spillover between p NQY\u0002RQNOVONUq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p JOIJ\u0002RQNOVONUq\u0002 necessarily occur.  \u05d6   Alongside its EU partners, Germany should therefore pay particular  attention as to how to upgrade the OSCEo s economic and environmental  dimension.  \u05d6   Connections between the OSCE dimensions should be actively promoted;  debates in the p secon\u0143\u0002\u0143OOGPUOQPq\u0002NQPN\u0143\u0002MG\u0002GXGP\u0002OQTG\u0002NNQUGN[\u0002 tied to the  discussion on the crumbling basic consensus over rule-based order and  common principles.           SWP   Research Paper       Franziska SmolnikCooperation, Trust,    Security?   The Potential   and Limits of the OSCE o s Economic and Environmental Dimension     Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik  German Institute for  International and Security Affairs  SWP Research Paper 16  December 2019, Berlin           All rights reserved.  \u00a9 Stiftung Wissenschaft  und Politik, 2019  SWP Research Papers are  peer reviewed by senior  researchers and the executive board of the Institute.  They are also subject to factchecking and copy-editing.  For further information  on our quality control procedures, please visit the  SWP website: https:\/\/  www.swp-berlin.org\/en\/  about-swp\/qualitymanagement-for-swp- publications\/.  SWP Research Papers reflect  the views of the author(s).  SWP  Stiftung Wissenschaft und  Politik  German Institute  for International  and Security Affairs  Ludwigkirchplatz 3V 4  10719 Berlin  Germany  Phone +49 30 880 07-0  Fax +49 30 880 07-200  www.swp-berlin.org  swp@swp-berlin.org  ISSN 1863-1053  doi: 10.18449\/2019RP16  Translation by Tom Genrich  (English version of  SWP-Studie 21\/2019)           Table of Contents       5  Issues and Recommendations    7  The OSCE Newly in Demand    7  The OSCE in the Shadow of NATO and the EU    8  Back from the Sidelines?   11  6JG\u000215%GoU\u00022JONQUQRJ[\u0002CP\u0143\u0002)PO\u0143OPI\u00022TOPNORNGU    11  Comprehensive Security   11  Cooperative Security   12  Unanswered Questions   14  Institutionalisation and Development of the Economic  and Environmental Dimension   17  6JG\u0002p4G\u0143OUNQXGT[q\u0002 of the Second Dimension   17  The Activation of the Second Dimension and the Role of  Chairmanships since 2014   20  Cooperation, Trust, Security: The Academic Debate   20  Cost-Benefit Calculation vs. Social Bonds   21  p 5RONNQXGTq\u0002MGVYGGP\u0002FOOGPUOQPU\u0002QT\u0002+PNTGCUOPI\u0002 Separation?   22  6JG\u000215%GoU\u00022JONQUQRJ[\u00024GXOUOVG\u0143    24  $GVYGGP\u0002p9OP -9OPq\u0002#UUPORVOQPU\u0002CP\u0143\u0002p0Q\u0002$PUOPGUU\u0002CU\u0002 7UPCNq    25  Insecurity\/Security in the Second Dimension   26  Vague Intentions to Cooperate   27  Making Progress in the Second Dimension: Some  Suggestions   27  +PNTGCUG\u0143\u0002%QOOOVOGPVE\u00026JG\u0002p*QYq\u0002+U\u00029JCV\u0002%QPPVU    29  Abbreviations           Dr Franziska Smolnik is Deputy Head of the Eastern Europe  and Eurasia Research Division.           Issues a nd  Recommendations   Cooperation, Trust,  Security?   The Potential   and Limits of the OSCE o s  Economic and Environmental Dimension   Following the Cold War, the Organisation for Security  and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led rather a niche  existence in the shadow of NATO and the European  Union (EU). However, starting in 2014 the OSCE has  attracted growing attention linked to the crisis in and  around Ukraine. Against the backdrop of tensions  between Russia on the one hand and the EU and USA  on the other, the Organisation with its inclusive and  consensus-based model has now returned to the fore.  The OSCE, which has 57 participating states and sees  itself as a platform for dialogue in the space between  Vancouver and Vladivostok, is regarded by many as  one of the few remaining multilateral communication forums between p GCUVq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p 9GUVq\u0104\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 thus as  a forum that should be further utilised.  In particular, the Organisationo s long-neglected  p UGNQP\u0143\u0002\u0143OOGPUOQPq\u0104\u0002YJONJ\u0002\u0143GCNU\u0002YOVJ\u0002GNQPQOON\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 environmental issues, has been revitalised in recent  years. Various governments consider the forum that  the Organisation (with its headquarters in Vienna)  offers for these policy fields as a platform for mutually beneficial cooperation with a de-escalating effect.  A common agenda on economic and environmental  issues, they argue, could help to restore lost trust between states. To this end, participants in the economic and environmental dimension explore such novel  issues as p GNQPQOON\u0002NQPPGNVOXOV[q\u0002QT\u0104\u0002OQTG\u0002TGNGPVN[\u0104\u0002 p digitisationq\u0010\u0002#NNQT\u0143OPI\u0002VQ\u0002VJG\u0002NCNNPNCVOQPU\u0002QH\u0002UQOG\u0002 Western states, cooperation on such (supposedly) less  intrusive matters could serve as an entry point and  subsequently also have a positive impact on dialogue  in the other dimensions: the first dimension dealing  with political-military security and the third, human  dimension of security. In these two areas there has  recently been little consensus and therefore little  progress. The agenda of the German OSCE chairmanship in 2016 was based on such an interpretation:  Under the guiding principle p Renewing dialogue, reMPON\u0143OPI\u0002VTPUV\u0104\u0002TGUVQTOPI\u0002UGNPTOV[q\u0104\u0002)GTOCP[\u0002CVVGORVG\u0143 to enhance the second dimension by focusing on  p connectivityq . The second dimension also attracted  attention under the subsequent Austrian (2017) and  Italian (2018) chairmanships, and Slovakia, which    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    5   Issues and Recommendations  holds the chair in 2019, has been continuing this  Ministerial Council at the end of each OSCE year, the  course by focusing on p digitisationq , p connectivityq   meetings of the economic and environmental dimenand p energyq .  sion, which take place throughout the year, could  Given the increased engagement in the previously  also be increasingly used for exchanges on the nexus  rather neglected second dimension, and against the  of the economy, the environment and security.  background of the accompanying expectations, a  Sustainable trust grows slowly and can be achieved  number of questions arise. What place should the  through specific measures only to a limited extent, if  economic and environmental dimension actually  at all. Nevertheless, trust is ultimately based on comhave in the overall OSCE structure? What potential  municative practice. Germany and the EU states could  does cooperation in this dimension have for sustain- therefore make intensive use of the meetings to proably generating trust? What conditions, if any, may  mote their own positions and communicate their own  need to be met for this trust to grow and for positive  values, even though they are not necessarily shared or  spillover to occur for dialogue within the OSCE as a  adopted by all other participating states. A (renewed)  whole? These questions, which also concern the  focus on a clear security reference in the second  (charged) relationship between the two titular corner- dimension may imply that, here too, the debates  stones of the OSCE, p UGNPTOV[q\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p NQQRGTCVOQPq\u0104\u0002 will  will be more controversial than before. As long as the  be examined in this study.  conflicting interests that certainly exist on economic  The study focuses on a specific area of activity of a  and environmental issues  as well can be discussed  specific international organisation: the economic and  dispassionately and, at best, productively, this should  environmental dimension of the OSCE. However, the  not be seen as a disadvantage.  insights it provides have wider applications. Given    the crumbling European security order, commentators have repeatedly stressed the possibility of generating trust through cooperation on less controversial  issues, thus ultimately contributing to a higher degree of security and stability in Europe. In this regard,  the results of the present study suggest a pragmatic  managing of expectations. The academic debate  reveals that a higher degree of intergovernmental  cooperation does not automatically mean more trust  between the actors involved. Moreover, positive spillover from negotiations on (supposedly) less entrenched  or contentious issues to more conflict-laden ones V   or from p NQYq\u0002VQ\u0002 p JOIJ\u0002RQNOVONUq  V  is by no means  guaranteed.  Adopting this sober view does not mean that reviving the OSCEo s economic and environmental  dimension is redundant. Yet it should be part of  reasonable expectations to focus particularly on how  to upgrade the second dimension. The study offers  some suggestions for this. Since positive spillover  hardly occurs by itself, Germany and other EU members could actively promote the linking of the economic and environmental dimension with the two  other dimensions V  for example, by continuing and  intensifying their current efforts to enshrine human  rights references in the documents of the second  dimension as well, and to assemble package solutions, i.e. to work towards a joint vote on decisions  from different dimensions. As well as the rounds of  negotiations on decisions to be put to the vote at the  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  6     The OSCE in the Shadow of NATO and the EU  The OSCE Newly in Demand   Following the end of the Cold War, the Organisation  The OSC E in the Shadow of NATO  for Security and Cooperation in Europe long played a  and   the   EU   subordinate, if not marginalised, role in the institutional structure of European security.1 After the col- In fact, NATO and the EU expanded not only their  lapse of the Soviet Union, the CSCE\/OSCE2 certainly  membership, but also their fields of activity and tasks.  had a place in the concept of a European security  After the end of the Cold War, NATO no longer saw  architecture consisting of several interlocking institu- itself merely as a defence alliance limited to the protions. However, compared to the EU and NATO, both  tection of its own territory. Instead, it added out-ofof which enlarged eastwards (in 2004 and 2007, and  area missions to its portfolio and, although military  in 1999 and 2004, respectively), its role became in- strength and deterrence remained core elements, it  creasingly diminished. As a result, the organisation  assumed additional tasks in the field of (civilian) crisis  was often associated more with niche functions or V   intervention. The EU as well developed instruments  at least from a traditional security perspective V  with  for crisis management V  as a supplement to its ecop UQHVq\u0002CURGNVU\u0002QH\u0002UGNPTOV[\u0002UPNJ\u0002CU\u0002GNGNVOQP\u0002QMUGTXCVOQP\u0104\u0002 nomic weight and financial resources, which it used  preventative diplomacy, or the protection of minori- in its foreign and security policy in the form of apties.3 Since at least the late 1990s, OSCE observers  propriate incentives and the prospect of sharing in  have attested to an institutional crisis; in the mid- economic prosperity. Furthermore, the EU strength2000s it culminated in some considering possibly  ened its capacity in conflict prevention and post-conwinding down the organisation completely.4  flict rehabilitation.5  The OSCE, with its inclusivity from the outset and  its larIG\u0002IGQITCRJONCN\u0002TCPIG\u0002HTQO\u0002p8CPNQPXGT\u0002VQ\u00028NC\u0143O XQUVQ\u00d3q\u0104\u0002YQPN\u0143\u0002JCXG\u0002 been an obvious candidate for a  central security organisation in Europe. Moscow, in  particular, had such a status in mind for the OSCE in  the 1990s and pushed ahead with corresponding reform proposals.6 However, the OSCE was unable to    keep pace with developments in NATO and the EU  1  Karl-Heinz Kamp, p The Power of Institutions: NATO, the post-Cold War. From the point of view of many WestG7\u0104\u0002CP\u0143\u0002VJG\u000215%Gq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 International Security in the 21st Century.  )GTOCP[oU\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00024GURQPUOMONOV[ , ed. James Bindenagel,  ern actors, the portfolio extension carried out by  Matthias Herdegen and Karl Kaiser (Bonn, 2017), 77V 82 (81).  these two organisations increasingly pushed the OSCE  2  In 1995 the OSCE evolved from the p Conference on Secu- into the background. Even though both NATO (e.g.  TOV[\u0002CP\u0143\u0002%QQRGTCVOQP\u0002OP\u0002GPTQRGq\u0002 %5%G\u000b\u0010   via the NATO-Russia Council) and the EU (e.g. within  3  William H. Hill, No Place for Russia. European Security  the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation  Institutions since 1989 (New York, 2018), 258 (203f.); Eric Jay Agreement) made offers of cooperation and engageMlyn, p 15%GE\u00020QY\u0002IQTG\u00026JCP\u0002GXGTq\u0104\u0002 Cambridge Review of  ment to the Kremlin, Russia considered itself excluded  International Affairs 11, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 227V 37 (228). In  addition to the EU, NATO and the OSCE, the Council of   Europe is also occasionally counted among these interlock- 5  Niels van Willigen and Joachim A. Koops, p 6JG\u0002G7oU\u0002 ing institutions in the literature.  Relationship with 0#61\u0002CP\u0143\u000215%Gq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 The SAGE Handbook of  4  Wolfgang Zellner, Identifying the Cutting Edge: The Future  European Foreign Policy, ed. Knud Erik J\u00fcrgensen et al., vol. 2  Impact of the OSCE, CORE Working Paper 17\/2007 (Hamburg: (London, 2015), 734V 46 (740).  Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the Uni- 6  Derek Averre, p 6JG\u00027\u00d3TCOPG\u0002%QPHNONVE\u00024PUUOCoU\u0002%JCNNGPIG\u0002 versity of Hamburg [IFSH], Centre for OSCE Research [CORE], VQ\u0002GPTQRGCP\u00025GNPTOV[\u0002)QXGTPCPNGq\u0104\u0002 Europe-Asia Studies 68,  2007).  no. 4 (June 2016): 699V 725 (703V 4).    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    7   The OSCE Newly in Demand  from the two most important organisations of Euro- other countries have accused the Organisation of bias  pean security, and thus marginalised in important  and p \u0143QPMNG\u0002UVCP\u0143CT\u0143Uq\u0002 towards the states p east of  decisions in this policy field. Unlike in the OSCE, it  8OGPPCq\u0010\u0002 Not least due to the numerical dominance of  had no voting or veto rights in either the EU or  EU and NATO states, the OSCE was accused of criticisNATO.7 The OSCE V  which unlike NATO has no  ing developments on the territory of the former Soviet  military capacities of its own, and unlike the EU no  Union in particular, and of interfering in the internal  significant financial resources either V  essentially  affairs of these countries.11 The different perspectives  had to modestly position itself within this institu- on European security issues increasingly influenced  tional trio as a forum for dialogue that concentrates  and paralysed decision-making within the Organisaon pNQY -OPVGPUOV[q\u0002 security aspects, and whose com- tion.12  parative strength in the political-military sphere lies  in confidence-building measures.8  The crisis that began in 2014 in and  The Russian proposals in the 1990s that aimed at  around  Ukraine marked a turning  reforming and upgrading the OSCE had met with a  point in the perception of the OS CE.   limited response on the part of the EU and the USA.  By the mid-2000s the organisation was viewed increasingly critically in Moscow.9 In particular, Russia  Back from the  Sidelines ?   and several other post-Soviet states criticised what  they saw as the Organisationo s one-sided focus on  The crisis that began in 2014 in and around Ukraine  human dimension issues, to the detriment of coop- marked a turning point in the perception of the OSCE.  eration in political-military affairs and economic and  The Organisation accrued importance; according to  environmental issues. In fact, the balance between  Frank-Walter Steinmeier, acting German president  dimensions had increasingly become a bone of con- and former foreign minister, it is once again p indistention between participating states.10 Russia and  RGPUCMNGq\u0002VQ\u0143C[\u0010 13 Various actors had previously criti7 Maria Raquel Freire, p Ukraine and the Restructuring of  Since the OSCE does not have the legal status of an interEast-9GUV\u00024GNCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 The Russian Challenge to the European  national organisation, the states represented in it are not  Security Environment, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Cham, 2017), 189V referred to as p OGOMGT\u0002UVCVGUq\u0104\u0002MPV\u0002CU\u0002 p RCTVONORCVOPI\u0002UVCVGUq\u0010   209; Averre, p 6JG\u00027\u00d3TCOPG\u0002%QPHNONVq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 6).  11  Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest. The Post-Cold War  8  Michael W. Mosser, p The EU and the OSCE: Partners or  Crisis of World Order, Cambridge 2017, 141; Frank Evers, In  4OXCNU\u0002OP\u0002VJG\u0002GPTQRGCP\u00025GNPTOV[\u0002#TNJOVGNVPTG!q\u0104\u00022CRGT\u0002RTG - Retrospect: Points for Dialogue with Russia in the OSCE Context.  sented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Confer- Conclusions from Russian Scientific Periodicals 2010V 2015, CORE  ence, Boston, 5V 8 March 2015; Roberto Dominguez, p Intro- Working Paper 31\/2018 (Hamburg: CORE, May 2018), 6.  \u0143PNVOQPE\u00026JG\u000215%G\u0002CU\u0002C\u00025GNPTOV[\u00022TQXO\u0143GTq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 The OSCE: Soft  12  Hill, No Place for Russia (see note 3), 322; Geneva Centre  Security for a Hard World. Competing Theories for Understanding for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)\/  the OSCE, ed. Roberto Dominguez (Berlin et al., 2014), 17V 27.  Centre for Security Studies (CSS), Empowering the OSCE in  9  Wolfgang Zellner, p Russia and the OSCE: From High  Challenging Times: Reflections and Recommendations. Conference  Hopes to Disillusionmentq , Cambridge Review of International  Report (Geneva, 2017),  Affairs 18, no. 3 (2005): 389V 402; Viatcheslav Morozov, p Rus- https:\/\/www.dcaf.ch\/sites\/default\/files\/publications\/documents UOCoU\u0002%JCPIOPI\u0002#VVOVP\u0143G\u0002VQYCT\u0143\u0002VJG\u000215%GE\u0002%QPVTC\u0143ONVOQPU\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 \/OSCE_Focus_2017_Report.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019).  %QPVOPPOV[q\u0104\u0002 Sicherheit und Frieden 23, no. 2 (2005): 69V 73;  13  Frank-Walter Steinmeier, p Foreword by the ChairpersonVictor-Yves Ghebali, p Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise  in-1HHONGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 OSCE Yearbook 2016, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden,  CP\u0143\u0002(CNN\u0002QH\u00024PUUOCoU\u00022CP -European Expectationsq\u0104\u0002 Cambridge  2018), 9V 11 (9); see also Hill, No Place for Russia (see note 3);  Review of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2005): 375V 88.  Stefan Lehne, Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the  10  These different prioritisations are also reflected in the Ukraine Crisis (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 22 September 2015),  difficult budget negotiations. While the EU is warning that https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/2015\/09\/22\/reviving-osce-europeanthe human dimension institutions in particular are not security-and-ukraine-crisis-pub-61362; OSCE Network of  adequately financed, Russia sees a problematic imbalance Think Tanks and Academic Institution to the Panel of EmiCMQXG\u0002CNN\u0002OP\u0002VJG\u000215%GoU\u0002UPRRQUG\u0143\u0002RTGHGTGPNG\u0002HQT\u0002VJG\u0002VJOT\u0143\u0002 nent Persons, Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through the  dimension, see, e.g., OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No.  OSCE (2015), 13, http:\/\/osce-network.net\/file-OSCE-Network\/  1288. Approval of the 2018 Unified Budget, PC.DEC\/1288, 15  documents\/Reviving_Co-operative_Security_in_Europe_  February 2018, https:\/\/www.osce.org\/permanent- through_the_OSCE_web.pdf (both accessed 20 August 2019);  council\/373016?download=true (accessed 23 April 2019).  Jan Asmussen, p Die Ukraine-Krise V  Hybride Kriegsf\u00fchrung  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  8     Back from the Sidelines?  cised the forum for dialogue and negotiation as an  However, the attitudes of the 15%GoU\u0002 participating  inefficient pVCN\u00d3OPI\u0002UJQR q\u0010 14 Since then, the Organisa- states continue to diverge with regard to which tasks  tion has been recognised as one of the few remaining  it should actually tackle.17 The divergence of opinion  platforms for communication between East and West.  is particularly marked concerning what degree of  Suddenly, those OSCE characteristics that were pre- importance human dimension issues should have in  viously held against it for limiting the Organisationo s  the OSCEo s work, in particular deploying election  room for manoeuvre, such as its strong consensus  observation missions, monitoring the freedom of the  orientation, were seen as advantages. In the OSCE,  press and media, and ensuring respect for human  the consensus rule is deviated from only in the case  rights. Consensus has therefore been the exception  of extremely flagrant violations of the institutiono s  rather than the rule in the third dimension for sevprinciples (p NQPUGPUPU\u0002OOPPU\u0002QPGq\u000b\u0104\u0002YJONJ\u0002\u0143G\u0002HCNVQ\u0002 eral years. The relevance of the first dimension,  grants the states represented in the OSCE a veto op- which covers political-military aspects of security, was  tion. Instead of sanctions to enforce norms, the OSCE  underscored by the crisis in and around Ukraine. The  relies on norm socialisation. The decisions it takes are  OSCEoU  Special Monitoring Mission which is deployed  not legally binding.  there is now regarded as a flagship of the entire Organisation. But here, too, we can see how deep the  According to its supporters, the OSCE  divisions currently are. In the context of conflicting  could contribute to restoring lost  Russian, European and American views on the threats  trust in Europe.   to European security and their causes, existing agreements such as the Vienna Document on ConfidenceIn view of current challenges to European security,  and Security-Building Measures are still waiting for  policy-oriented observers see a particular advantage  updates. The current setbacks in international arms  in the OSCEo s niche position and function in the  control give little cause for confidence that there will  shadow of NATO and the EU, and in its specific in- be progress in this area within the OSCE in the foreclusive formats and decision-making processes. For  seeable future.18 The Structured Dialogue, a relatively  them, the OSCE is predestined to be a place of dia- new format for exchanges in the political-military  logue between all relevant actors since it is a non- field, was decided at the OSCE Ministerial Council in  partisan, neutral forum, in which all represented  Hamburg in 2016. While its establishment was linked  states have equal voting rights and thus act on an  to hopes for rapprochement between Russia and the  equal footing, officially at least.15 According to its  Western states, it has also recently lost momentum,  supporters, the Organisation could thus contribute  at least according to some close observers.19  to restoring lost trust in Europe.16    apier-spdfraktion-dialog-vertrauen-sicherheit-20181009.pdf    (accessed 16 September 2019).  PP\u0143\u0002\u0143OG\u00029OG\u0143GTIGMPTV\u0002\u0143GT\u000215KGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Globale Sicherheit und die  17  Andrei Zagorski, Strengthening the OSCE. Building a Common  Zukunft politischer Ordnungen, ed. Andrea Gawrich and Wil- Space for Economic and Humanitarian Cooperation, an Indivisible  helm Knelangen (Opladen et al., 2017), 163V 82.  Security Community from the Atlantic to the Pacific (Moscow,  14  P. Terrence Hopmann, p The Future Impact of the OSCE:  2014), 15.  $PUOPGUU\u0002CU\u00027UPCN\u0002QT\u00024GXOVCNO\\CVOQP!q\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 OSCE Yearbook 2008,  18  Wolfgang Richter, Erneuerung der konventionellen R\u00fcstungsed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2009), 75V 90 (88), https:\/\/ifsh.de\/file- kontrolle in Europa. Vom Gleichgewicht der Bl\u00f6cke zur regionalen  CORE\/documents\/yearbook\/english\/08\/Hopmann-en.pdf  Stabilit\u00e4t in der Krise, SWP Study 17\/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung  (accessed 16 April 2019).  Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2019); on the Vienna Docu15 FG\u0002HCNVQ\u0104\u0002VJG\u000215%GoU\u0002RCTVONORCVOPI\u0002UVCVGU\u0002JCXG\u0002\u0143OHHGTGPV\u0002 ment see pp. 21V 25.  weight within it, see Vincent Pouliot, p Hierarchy in Practice:  19  Christian N\u00fcnlist, 6JG\u000215%GoU\u0002IONOVCT[\u00022ONNCTE\u00026JG\u00025YOUU\u0002(5%\u0002 Multilateral Diplomacy and the Governance of International Chairmanship, CSS Analyses in Security Policy 237\/2018  Securityq\u0104\u0002 European Journal of International Security 1, no. 1  (Zurich: Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich [CSS],  (2016): 5V 26.  December 2018), https:\/\/ethz.ch\/content\/dam\/ethz\/special16 See e.g. the position paper by the SPD Parliamentary interest\/gess\/cis\/center-for-securitiesGroup in the Bundestag, Dialog V  Vertrauen V  Sicherheit.  studies\/pdfs\/CSSAnalyse237-EN.pdf; idem, p Under Pressure:  Voraussetzungen und Impulse f\u00fcr eine zeitgem\u00e4\u00dfe sozialdemokrati- The Uncertain Future of VJG\u000215%G\u00025VTPNVPTG\u0143\u0002FOCNQIPGq\u0104\u0002 sche Entspannungspolitik (Berlin, October 2018),  Security and Human Rights Monitor (online), 29 November 2018  https:\/\/www.spdfraktion.de\/system\/files\/documents\/positionsphttps:\/\/www.shrmonitor.org\/under-pressure-the-uncertainSWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    9   The OSCE Newly in Demand  In view of this, the OSCEo s long neglected second  dimension has garnered attention. The OSCE Panel of  Eminent Persons even reports VJCV\u0002pOP\u0002 a radical reverse of the past 30 years, the economic and environmental dimension is no longer the n empty basketo   and, at the moment, is one of the few entry points for  dialogue between Europe and Russiaq\u0010 20 Those in  favour of intensifying cooperation in this dimension  believe that the exchange on (supposedly) less controversial economic and environmental issues is an  opportunity to resume a more constructive dialogue  between Vancouver and Vladivostok. The trust regained within this framework could ultimately,  according to these calculations, provide a foundation  for positive dynamics in other areas with which the  Organisation is concerned.21    future-of-the-osce-structured-dialogue\/ (both accessed 20  August 2019).  20  Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward.  Report on Outreach Events of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project in 2016 (23 November 2016),  9, https:\/\/www.osce.org\/networks\/291001?download=true  (accessed 16 April 2019).  21  This study focuses on the interaction of participating  states and Vienna-based delegations in the economic and  environmental dimension. Its findings are based on various  OSCE documents, secondary literature and informal background discussions. Further insights were provided by the  CPVJQToU\u0002 stay of several months at the German representation to the OSCE in Vienna, with a focus on the economic  and environmental dimension. The work of the field missions and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic  and Environmental Activities in the OSCE Secretariat is not  dealt with here, taking into account the background of the  strongly intergovernmental character of the Organisation.  On OSCE intergovernmentality see, Michael W. Bauer and  J\u00f6rn Ege, p Bureaucratic Autonomy of International Organi\\CVOQPUo\u00025GNTGVCTOCVUq\u0104\u0002 Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 7  (April 2016): 1019V 37; Kurt P. Tudyka, p The Margin beyond  Intergovernmentalism. The Organization for Security and  %QQRGTCVOQP\u0002OP\u0002GPTQRGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations, ed. Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek  (London and New York, 2003), 108V 19.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  10     Comprehensive Security  6JG\u000215%GoU\u0002 Philosophy and  G uiding  P rinciples   Those forces wanting to revive the second dimension,  Cooperative Security   expecting positive impulses for the Organisation as a  whole and for European security, start with two close- Along with a comprehensive understanding of seculy connected guiding principles of the OSCE: the crea- rity, the CSCE\/OSCE also represented the concept of  tion of cooperative security and of comprehensive  p NQQRGTCVOXG\u0002UGNPTOV[q : p Security is indivisible and the  security. Both concepts have shaped the CSCE since its  security of every participating State is inseparably  inception in the 1970s.  linked to VJCV\u0002QH\u0002CNN\u0002QVJGTUq ; it cannot be achieved at  the cost of other participating states.23 From this perspective, the lack of security of one state has a negaComprehensive Security   tive impact on all others.24 Cooperative security thus  ideally excludes the use of physical force or its threat  In its founding phase, the CSCE was ahead of other  among the participating states of the CSCE\/OSCE. The  international actors, who had a narrower security  p FGNCNQIPGq\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u0002*GNUOP\u00d3O\u0002(OPCN\u0002#NV\u0104\u0002QP\u0002YJONJ\u0002VJG\u0002 understanding; even then it did not limit p UGNPTOV[q  to  participating states agreed in 1975, already underpolitical-military issues. Instead, the state conference  lined this: among its fundamental principles were  also subsumed cooperation in the fields of economics,  peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use and nonthe environment and science under the term security,  threat of force, and cooperation among states.25 With  as well as social, humanitarian, cultural and partici- the concept of cooperative security, the CSCE\/OSCE  patory aspects. Organisationally, this concept of com- thus also transcended the prevailing understanding of  prehensive security was expressed in the structure of  security by replacing confrontational strategies based  conference work in the so-called p VJTGG\u0002MCU\u00d3GVUq\u0104\u0002NCVGT\u0002 on coercion or military deterrence with cooperative  renamed p VJTGG\u0002\u0143OOGPUOQPUq : the first, political-mili- approaches. The latter can essentially develop from  tary dimension; the second, dealing with economic  negotiations and consultations and are based on  and environmental issues; and the third, the human  transparency, persuasion and consensus V  leitmotifs  dimension. On the one hand, the concept of compre- that are reflected in the (decision-making) structures  hensive security took account of the fact that security  and composition of the OSCE as an institution.26  is multi-layered and complex and therefore cannot be  reduced to political-military aspects. On the other, it    was also an expression of the different interests of the  23  Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris, 1990), 5,  participating states from the very beginning of the  https:\/\/www.osce.org\/mc\/39516?download=true (accessed 16  CSCE process, allowing these different priorities to be  April 2019).  balanced by serving all three baskets.22  24  See, e.g., ibid.  25  Georgeta Pourchot, p The OSCE: A Pan-European Society  OP\u0002VJG\u0002IC\u00d3OPI!q\u0104\u0002 European Integration 33, no. 2 (March 2011):  179V 95 (180).  26  Heinz Vetschera, p Cooperative Security V  the Concept  CP\u0143\u0002OVU\u0002#RRNONCVOQP\u0002OP\u00025QPVJ\u0002GCUVGTP\u0002GPTQRGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Approaching    or Avoiding Cooperative Security? V  The Western Balkans in the  22  Vojtech Mastny, The Helsinki Process and Reintegration of  Aftermath of the Kosovo Settlement Proposal and the Riga Summit,  Europe 1986V 1991. Analysis and Documentation (New York,  ed. Ernst M. Felberbauer, Predrag Jurekovi\u00e4\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric  1992), 4, 15.  Labarre (Vienna, 2007), 33V 56 (34V 40).    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    11   6JG\u000215%GoU\u00022JONQUQRJ[\u0002CP\u0143\u0002)PO\u0143OPI\u00022TOPNORNGU   Although comprehensive security and  sessment that pV he debate on the relative strength and  cooperative security are constitutive  relationship between the various dimensions of secuguiding principles of the CSCE\/OSCE,  rity continues in the OSCE and will probably never  both concepts do raise questions.   leave its agendaq  will likely continue to be valid.29  It is not only the concept of comprehensive security that is insufficiently defined. There are also unUnanswered Q uestions   answered questions regarding the approach to cooperative security.30 At its core or as an ideal, the conAlthough comprehensive security and cooperative  cept of cooperative security is based on the premise  security are constitutive guiding principles of the  that all countries involved have a genuine interest in  CSCE\/OSCE, both concepts do raise questions. They  cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange, and  have also prompted criticism of the OSCE and discus- treat each other with goodwill.31 However, this readsion about reforming it. In principle, participating  ing of cooperative security already presupposes the  states continue to support the 15%GoU\u0002 broad portfolio,  existence of a certain degree of trust as a basic condiwhich goes hand in hand with a comprehensive ap- tion for cooperation to occur in the first place V  trust  proach. However, assessments of what areas of re- which is actually only generated by cooperation; at  sponsibility the OSCE should prioritise, and how  least, that is the hope associated with a revival of the  these should be fleshed out, as well as opinions about  second dimension. Some critics therefore tend to be  the right balance between the three dimensions, have  sceptical about the cooperative-security approach,  always diverged considerably. These divergences  and consider the expectations associated with it as  reflect the UVCVGUo\u0002 different interests and specific secu- exaggerated. In Antonio OrtizoU\u0002CUUGUUOGPV\u0104\u0002p the  rity challenges. However, their emergence was also  15%GoU\u0002NQQRGTCVOXG\u0002UGNPTOV[\u0002OU\u0002=e?\u0002OPUPHHONOGPV\u0002CU\u0002OV\u0002 facilitated by the fact that there has thus far been  presumes from states an automatic goodwill and  little definition of the concept of comprehensive  permanent good faith\u0010q 32 In fact, the debate on co-opsecurity. In most cases, reference is only made to the  erative security goes beyond the OSCE. It reflects difrough thematic division of the three dimensions.  ferent perspectives on international relations, which  Especially in the early days of the CSCE, the compre- in turn are expressed in different assessments of  hensive approach manifested itself in the form of  UVCVGUo\u0002YONNOPIPGUU\u0002VQ\u0002NQQRGTCVG\u0002QT\u0002VGP\u0143GPN[\u0002VQ\u0002NQO p RCN\u00d3CIG\u0002UQNPVOQPUq : a combination of elements from  different baskets.27 There is consensus that the three  dimensions are interrelated in principle; however,    how this can be implemented both operationally and  www.osce.org\/mc\/17504?download=true (accessed 16 April  conceptually has yet to be clarified. The 15%GoU\u0002 2019).  Maastricht Strategy of 2003, which identifies security  29  Monika Wohlfeld, p Reconceptualizing of Security in the  challenges in the new century, acknowledges that  %5%G\u0002CP\u0143\u000215%Gq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Globalization and Environmental Challenges.  they can often no longer be assigned to a single  Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, ed. Hans G\u00fcnter  dimension. The document lists numerous new threats  Brauch et al. (Berlin and Heidelberg, 2007), 643V 50 (650).  transcending the three dimensions and emphasises  30  Keating and Wheeler consider the expression p cooperathat they can only be addressed by strengthening the  VOXG\u0002UGNPTOV[q\u0002OP\u0002IGPGTCN\u0002 V  meaning independently of its use  OSCEo s multidimensional approach. However, how  within the OSCE V  a n nebulous conNGRVo\u0002YOVJQPV\u0002NNGCT\u0002\u0143GHO this envisaged p NQQT\u0143OPCVG\u0143q\u0002OORNGOGPVCVOQP\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u0002 nition: Vincent Keating and Nicholas J. Wheeler, p Concepts  and Practices of Cooperative Security. Building Trust in the  comprehensive approach should actually take shape  +PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00025[UVGOq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 The Legacy of the Cold War. Perspectives  is not explained here either.28 Monika Wohlfeldo s as- on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict, ed. Vojtech Mastny and    Zhu Liqun (Lanham, 2013), 57V 78 (59). See also Esko Antola,  27  Antonio Ortiz, p Neither Fox nor Hedgehog: 0#61oU\u0002 p 6JG\u0002%5%G\u0002CU\u0002C\u0002%QNNCMQTCVOXG\u00021T\u0143GTq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Processes of InterComRTGJGPUOXG\u0002#RRTQCNJ\u0002CP\u0143\u0002VJG\u000215%GoU\u0002%QPNGRV\u0002QH\u0002 national Negotiations, ed. Frances Mautner-Markhof (Boulder  5GNPTOV[q\u0104\u0002 Security and Human Rights 19, no. 4 (2008): 284V 97  et al., 1989), 43V 53 (43V 45).  (284V 290); Dominguez, p +PVTQ\u0143PNVOQPq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 8), 19V 20.  31  The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, for example,  The first explicit references to p NQORTGJGPUOXG\u0002UGNPTOV[q\u0002CU\u0002C\u0002 states that the relations of the participating states should be  specific concept are found in texts from the 1990s.  based on p TGURGNVq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p NQQRGTCVOQPq\u0010   28  OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in  32  Ortiz, p 0GOVJGT\u0002(QR\u0002PQT\u0002*G\u0143IGJQIq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 27), 297;  the Twenty-First Century, Vienna, December 2003,  Vetschera, p %QQRGTCVOXG\u00025GNPTOV[q\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 26), 36.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  12     Unanswered Questions  pete, and the associated issue of the role that international organisations play.33  The basic principles of the CSCE\/OSCE  associated with cooperative security  may have enjoyed general recognition  in principle, but their implementa tion has remained sketchy.   Concrete developments in the OSCE area, from the  bloody conflicts in the Balkans to the secession conflicts in the South Caucasus to, more recently, the  Donbas conflict, have demonstrated the limits of the  cooperative approach. The basic principles of the  CSCE\/OSCE associated with the concept may have  enjoyed general recognition in principle, as do the decisions based on them, but their practical implementation in the OSCE area has always remained sketchy.34  Moreover, long-standing OSCE observers point out  that the norms and principles of the Organisation are  increasingly interpreted differently by participating  states and that a p PQTOCVOXG\u0002ICRq\u0002JCU\u0002CTOUGP\u0002YOVJ\u0002 negative consequences for cooperative security.35  In addition to these reservations about the concept  of cooperative security, which have been deepened  with recent developments, there are also differing  assessments of the CSCEoU\u0002JOUVQTON\u0002TQNG , for example  in overcoming the Cold War. A p TGVPTP\u0002VQ\u0002*GNUOP\u00d3Oq\u0002 is currently gathering support, yet various contemporary witnesses and historical analyses, while certainly  highlighting and acknowledging the merits of the  CSCE, have come to more circumscribed conclusions  regarding its influence on the upheaval in world  history during the late 1980s. For these critics, the  CSCE was more an expression of the general world  political climate than an effective agent of change.  According to US historian Cathal J. Nolan, the CSCE  was pO ore a barometer of than a cause of the level of  detenteq\u0002CP\u0143  p more [e ] a stenographer than an executive of changeq .36    33  John Baylis, p European Security between the n Logic of  #PCTNJ[o\u0002CP\u0143\u0002VJG\u0002 n .QION\u0002QH\u0002%QOOPPOV[oq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Redefining European Security, ed. Carl C. Hodge (New York and London, 1999),  13V 28.  34  K amp, p 6JG\u00022QYGT\u0002QH\u0002+PUVOVPVOQPUq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 1), S. 81V 82; Pourchot, p 6JG\u000215%Gq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 25), 185.    35  OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institu-rity, ed. Hodge (see note 33), 299V 332 (310, 312); see also  tions, European Security V  Challenges at the Societal Level (Ham- Baylis, p GPTQRGCP\u00025GNPTOV[q\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 33), 24; Mastny, The  burg, 2016), 15, 30.  Helsinki Process (see note 22), 4; Kalevi J. Holsti, p Bargaining  36  Cathal J. Nolan, p The OSCE: Nonmilitary Dimensions of 6JGQT[\u0002CP\u0143\u0002FORNQOCVON\u00024GCNOV[E\u0002VJG\u0002%5%G\u00020GIQVOCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002 Cooperative SecPTOV[\u0002OP\u0002GPTQRGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Redefining European Secu- Review of International Studies 8, no. 3 (1982): 159V 70 (167).    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    13   Institutionalisation and Development of the Economic and Environmental Dimension  Institutionalisation and  D evelopment of the  E conomic  and  E nvironmental  D imension   In line with the concept of comprehensive security,  The Economic Forum (later Economic and Environeconomic and environmental issues have been part  mental Forum, EEF),39 founded in 1992, was also inof the CSCE\/OSCEo s field of activity from the outset.  tended to promote the political and economic transAlready in 1975, cooperation on economic, scientific,  formation of former socialist states. The annual contechnological and environmental issues was among  cluding meeting of the EEF has been the most importhe ten principles laid down in the Final Act of the  tant and high-ranking event in the annual calendar  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  of the second dimension.40 The annual meeting is de(Helsinki Final Act). This cooperation formed the  signed as a platform for dialogue, and aims to provide  second of the p VJTGG\u0002MCU\u00d3GVUq\u0010\u0002FQNPOGPVU\u0002HTQO\u0002VJG\u0002 political impetus and strategic orientation for coopearly days of the CSCE list a wealth of topics subsumed  eration between states in the economic and environunder the p UGNQP\u0143\u0002MCU\u00d3GVq , from scientific contacts to  mental fields in support of other, more operational  industrial cooperation and trade to the protection of  international organisations.41  the marine environment. This diversity mirrored the  In particular with the adoption of the OSCE Strategy  challenges of enabling an exchange between two  Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension in  completely different economic and social systems.37  2003, the second dimension received greater attenWith the collapse of the Soviet Union, however,  tion, including within the Organisation itself. The  the latter issue faded away. A new task became key:  paper identified new challenges and threats to Euroto support the transition of the former socialist coun- pean economic and environmental security in the  tries to functioning and sustainable market econo- light of developments over the previous decade, inmies. Thus, in the 1990 Document of the Bonn Conference  cluding a deepening of socio-economic inequalities,  on Economic Co-operation in Europe, the participating  growing poverty and unemployment, increasing  states recognised the pTGNCVOQPUJOR\u0002 between political  environmental degradation, and shortcomings in  pluralism and market economiesq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002HPTVJGT\u0002 acknowledged that democratic institutions and econom- #MCPV\u0002\u010b\\\\GV\u0002$C[UCN\u00027POXGTUOV[\u0002HQPTPCN\u0002QH\u0002)TC\u0143PCVG\u00025NJQQN\u0002QH\u00025QNOCN\u0002 ic freedom advance economic and social progress.38  Sciences 18, no. 1 (2018): 165V 91.  39  In 2006 the Economic Forum was renamed the Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF) in order to better reflect  37  OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension Commit- its thematic scope.  ments. Reference Manual 2018 (Vienna, 2018), 17. Kurt P.  40  The Economic and Environmental Forum now consists  Tudyka, p The Second Basket: Evolution of the Economic and of a total of three dates: the key concluding meeting is preGPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002FOOGPUOQP\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u000215%Gq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 OSCE Yearbook  ceded by two preparatory meetings.  2016, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2018), 295V 307 (295).  41  OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental  38  CSCE, Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-opera- Dimension (Maastricht, 2003), www.osce.org\/eea\/  tion in Europe (Bonn, 11 April 1990), 2, 4; OSCE, OSCE Economic  20705?download=true (accessed 30 August 2019); OSCE,  and Environmental Dimension (see note 37), 74V 76; see also  Economic and Environmental Forum: 20 Years (Vienna, 2012),  Hakan Karaaslan, p An Analysis of the Economic and Envi- www.osce.org\/secretariat\/98230 (accessed 16 April 2019).  ronmental Dimension of the Organization for Security and OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension (see note 37),  %QQRGTCVOQP\u0002OP\u0002GPTQRGE\u0002HPUV\u0002C\u00024JGVQTON\u0002QT\u00024GCNOV[!q\u0104\u0002 Bolu  103.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  14     Institutionalisation and Development of the Economic and Environmental Dimension  governance. Participating states also outlined how  set by the annually changing OSCE chairmanships.  they intend to respond jointly to these problems and  The Co-ordinator reports regularly on his work to the  threats in individual fields, and what possibilities  delegations in the Permanent Council, the OSCEo s  they saw for strengthening the OSCE accordingly.42  weekly decision-making body. In general, however,  For example, they wanted to increase the impact of  interaction with the delegations is somewhat limited  the Economic Forum as a key event of the second  or happens more effectively at bi- or minilateral level,  dimension. According to an OSCE decision of the  for example within the framework of targeted project  following year, the EEF should be used even more  financing, when participating states (individually or  strongly and purposefully for political dialogue be- in combination) initiate specific projects through  tween the participating states on key economic and  extra-budgetary contributions.47  environmental challenges and their impact on European security.43 Two years before the Maastricht  Despite its scope, the second  strategy document, in 2001, the Economic Forum had  di mension remained organisationally  already been joined by another body. The Economic  and conceptually underdeveloped  and Environmental Subcommittee (later renamed  compared to the first and third.   the Economic and Environmental Committee, EEC),  which meets regularly in Vienna, was meant to  Despite the wealth of issues falling within its scope  strengthen the second dimension structurally, pro- and its gradual institutional anchoring following the  viding a space in between EEF meetings for OSCE  end of the Cold War, the second dimension remained  delegations to exchange views on economic and  organisationally and conceptually underdeveloped  environmental issues and their security policy im- compared to the first and third. Moreover, the impleplications on an ongoing basis.44  mented projects were often too small to significantly  Unlike in the other two dimensions, there are no  reduce economic and environmental challenges.48  separate institutions assigned to the economic and  The Economic and Environmental Forum has been  environmental dimension.45 Since 1997, however, the  accused of failing over the years to fulfil its task of  Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and  facilitating a comprehensive debate between political  Environmental Activities (OCEEA) has been active in  decision-makers and representatives of business,  the Vienna Secretariat of the Organisation. Reporting  directly to the Secretary General, it maintains contact    with the OSCEo s field missions and assists participat- 47  In 2009 the informal working group on ways to enhance  ing states in translating second dimension decisions  the second dimension noted critically in its report that parinto national laws and regulations. The OCEEA pro- ticipating states focused their attention on the topics set by  vides training courses and seminars aimed at capacity  the respective chairmanship, but then showed little interest  building and the dissemination of best practices,  OP\u0002VJG\u00021%GG#oU\u0002HPTVJGT\u0002YQT\u00d3\u0002QP\u0002GCTNOGT\u0002RTOQTOVOGU\u0010\u0002%QQT\u0143OPC\u000f often conducted in cooperation with field missions,  tion between the delegations and the staff of field missions  and it also has a monitoring function as part of the  entrusted with economic and environmental issues was said  OSCEo s early warning role.46 The thematic radius of  to be even less developed: Findings and Recommendations of the  the OCEEA (and the field missions) results from the  Chairman of the Informal Working Group of Friends on the Future  Orientation of the Economic and Environmental Dimension of the  consensual decisions of the OSCE Ministerial Council,  OSCE\u0104\u0002%JCOTOCPUJORoU\u00024GRQTV\u0104\u0002%+1B)#.B86BC8\u0002 17\u0002HPN[\u00021CC8\u000b\u0104\u0002 which at times entrust the OCEEA with specific (fol- 5; 11\/12, http:\/\/bit.ly\/2kDWYGh (accessed 16 April 2019).  low-up) tasks, as well as from the respective priorities  48  Kilian Strauss points out that OSCE projects often have a    signalling or catalytic effect, attracting projects with a wider  42  OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension (see  reach by other, more resource-intensive, organisations.  note 37), 155V 71.  Payam Foroughi, on the other hand, arrives at a much more  43  Ibid, 206.  pessimistic assessment, accusing the OSCE of p RTQLGNVGTOVOUq\u0104\u0002 44  Ibid, 147V 148.  a tendency that does more harm than good on the ground,  45  See, e.g., the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions Kilian Strauss, p Economic and Environmental Security  and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw as an institution of 5JQPN\u0143\u00024GOCOP\u0002-G[\u0002%QORQPGPVU\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u000215%GoU\u0002%QTG\u0002ICP\u000f the third dimension.  \u0143CVGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 OSCE Yearbook 2008, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2009),  46  To identify emerging crises and challenges at an early 311V 19 (314); Payam Foroughi, p The Helsinki Final Act Four  stage V  and then to react accordingly V  OU\u0002QPG\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u000215%GoU\u0002 FGNC\u0143GU\u0002QPq\u0104\u0002 Central Asian Survey 36, no. 3 (2017): 293V 99  primary tasks, along with conflict prevention and resolution.  (296).    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    15   Institutionalisation and Development of the Economic and Environmental Dimension  academia and civil society.49 Torbj\u00f8rn Bjorvatn,  who  has worked within the OSCE on the economic and  environmental dimension, summarised the deficits as  follows: p Despite continued efforts to boost its significance and impact, the 2nd dimension has never attained the political leverage or conceptual coherence  of the other two dimensionsq\u0010 50 Even after the institutional expansions, the economic and environmental  dimension remained the OSCEo s p UVGRNJON\u0143q\u0010       49  Tudyka, p 6JG\u00025GNQP\u0143\u0002$CU\u00d3GVq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 37). See also:  International Peace Institute, Economic Connectivity. A Basis for  Rebuilding Stability and Confidence in Europe? (Vienna, 2016), 1;  John de Fonblanque, p Strengthening the Economic and  GPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002FOOGPUOQP\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u000215%G\u0002 GGF\u000bq\u0104\u0002 Helsinki Monitor 16, no. 3 (September 2005): 180V 83 (181); Victor-Yves  Gh\u00e9bali, The OSCE between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease  on Life, DCAF Policy Paper 10\/2005 (Geneva: DCAF, November  2005), 5.  50  Torbj\u00f8rn Bjorvatn, 6JG\u000215%GoU\u0002GNQPQOON\u0002CP\u0143\u0002GPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002 Dimension: Enhancing Relevance and Impact, Nordem Thematic  Paper Series (Oslo: University of Oslo, Norwegian Centre for  Human Rights, 2014), 3.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  16     The Activation of the Second Dimension and the Role of Chairmanships since 2014  The  p4 G\u0143OUNQXGT[q\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u0002 S econd  D imension   Given the aforementioned shortcomings, it is not  (Switzerland\/Serbia, Germany, Austria, Italy, Slovakia)  surprising that the debate on a possible upgrading  and their efforts to (better) harness what they conand increased visibility of the OSCEo s economic and  sider the unused bridging potential of economic and  environmental dimension is longstanding. A number  environmental issues in view of the current threats to  of Ministerial Council decisions aimed at strengthen- European security.52 The countries holding the OSCE  ing the economic and environmental dimension, as  chairmanship are of particular importance because of  well as food-for-thought and discussion papers, which  the political leadership they provide during the onewere often developed within or at the request of the  year term, and the influence they thus have on the  OSCE, had this objective in mind.51 The vast majority  agenda.  of these initiatives, however, dates back to the period  before the crisis in and around Ukraine. The p rediscov- The revitalisation of the second  GT[q\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u0002UGNQP\u0143\u0002\u0143OOGPUOQP\u0002OP\u0002TGNGPV  years, on the  dimension aims to harness the  other hand, is precisely a reaction to the changed  bridging potential of economic and  security environment since 2014 and the associated  environmental issues.   change in perception of the 15%GoU\u0002 importance.  The 2014 Swiss chairmanship marked the beginning of the revival. The extent of the tensions that  The  A ctivation of the  S econd  D imension  would arise in the context of the crisis in and around  and the  R ole  of Chair manships   since 2014   Ukraine could hardly have been foreseen when  Switzerland set the priorities for its term of office.  The upgrading of the second dimension is particularly  Yet, at the concluding meeting of the Economic and  linked to the OSCE chairmanships of recent years  Environmental Forum in autumn 2014, and thus  after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Didier    Burkhalter, then Swiss Foreign Minister and OSCE  51  See Findings and Recommendations (see note 47); OSCE,  Chairperson-in-Office, justified the envisaged upgradThe 18th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum. Part II, 24V 26  ing of the second dimension by pointing to these  May 2010 Prague. Follow-up Ideas, EEF.GAL\/6\/10 (Vienna, 17  political V  and thus to the related economic V  disMay 2010), www.osce.org\/eea\/68086?download=true; OSCE,  tortions. Burkhalter suggested extending the classic  Workshop on Economic and Environmental Activities as Confidence- instruments and tasks of the OSCE, such as confidencebuilding Measures, CIO.INF\/29\/11 (27 May 2011),  www.osce.org\/cio\/78201?download=true (both accessed    16 April 2019); International Peace Institute, Responding to  52  6JG\u0002UGNQP\u0143\u0002\u0143OOGPUOQPoU\u0002URGNOHON\u0002RQV ential for confiNatural Disasters: What Role for the OSCE? (Vienna, June 2011);  dence-building measures has been discussed in individual  Bjorvatn, 6JG\u000215%GoU\u0002GNQPQOON\u0002CP\u0143\u0002GPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002FOOGPUOQP  (see  policy papers, see, e.g. Stefan Wolff, Economic Diplomacy and  note 50); Fonblanque, p Strengthening the Economic and  Connectivity. What Role for the OSCE? (Birmingham, 2018),  GPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002FOOGPUOQPq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 49); Piotr Switalski,  https:\/\/www.birmingham.ac.uk\/Documents\/college-socialp The Economic Dimension V  in Search of OSCE Added  sciences\/government-society\/iccs\/news-events\/2018\/Osce8CNPGq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 OSCE Yearbook 1999, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2000),  Report.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019); International Peace  367V 75; Frank Evers, Balancing by Cross-Linking. Renewed  Institute, Economic Connectivity (see note 49); OSCE Network of  Dialogue on the OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension,  Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, OSCE Confidence BuildCORE Working Paper 21\/2010 (Hamburg: CORE, October ing in the Economic and Environmental Dimension. Current Oppor2010). tunities and Constraints (Vienna, 2017).    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    17   6JG\u0002p4G\u0143OUNQXGT[q\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u00025GNQP\u0143\u0002FOOGPUOQP   building measures and monitoring, to economic  reduNG\u0002RQNOVONCN\u0002VGPUOQPUq\u0010 57 A few months earlier, the  issues; the OSCE would also serve as a platform for an  then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had  inclusive debate on the nexus between the economy  already expressed similar views at the opening of the  and security.53 With the latter idea, Burkhalter took  business conference p Connectivity for Commerce and  up earlier demands for upgrading the EEF, as out- +PXGUVOGPVq\u0104\u0002C\u0002 forum which the German government  lined.  subsequently lauded as a flagship event of the second  With regard to the second dimension, the Swiss  dimension under its chairmanship. Especially in  p NTOUOU\u0002NJCOTOCPUJORq 54 is also associated with the  times of crisis, Steinmeier said, p RQNOVONCN\u0002XOUOQPUq\u0002JC\u0143\u0002 concept of p NQPPGNVOXOV[q , even though this term had  to be discussed, and economic cooperation in the  not yet found its way into the official OSCE vocabu- service of building trust had a special role to play in  lary in 2014. This happened two years later: Germa- these situations.58 The German NJCOTOCPUJORoU\u0002 connyo s OSCE chairmanship in 2016 continued from that  cern to intensify the dialogue between participating  of the Swiss in the economic and environmental  states under the banner of the guiding RTOPNORNG\u0002pN onfields to the extent that the German government  PGNVOXOV[q\u0104\u0002 increase their willingness to cooperate, and  adopted the concept of p NQPPGNVOXOV[q 55 and, in com- thus make better use of the bridging function of the  bination with a focus QP\u0002p IQQ\u0143\u0002IQXGTPCPNGq\u0104\u0002RNCNG\u0143\u0002OV\u0002 economic and environmental dimension, was fulat the centre of its work on the second dimension. It  filled at least to the extent that a resolution in favour  wanted the concept of connectivity not only to give  of this approach was agreed at the 2016 Ministerial  new relevance specifically to the economic and  Council in Hamburg.59 The term p NQPPGNVOXOV[q\u0002VJPU\u0002 environmental dimension, but also have it serve the  entered the official terminology of the OSCE.  chairmanUJORoU\u0002 overall objective of p renewing dia- The subsequent Austrian chairmanship in 2017 as  NQIPGq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p rebuilding trustq\u0010 56 The Special Repre- well pursued the topic of p GNQPQOON\u0002NQPPGNVOXOV[q\u0002 sentative of the German government for the OSCE  alongside its own priorities of p ITGGP\u0002GNQPQO[q\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 Chairmanship, Gernot Erler, emphasised in his speech  p GNQPQOON\u0002RCTVONORCVOQPq\u0010\u0002#PUVTOC\u0002CNUQ\u0002GRRNONOVN[\u0002LPUVO at the concluding meeting of the EEF 2016 that eco- fied its choice of topics with the aim of better exploitnomic issues were to be given more weight within the  ing the trust-building and tension-reducing potential  OSCE framework and that, in particular, an increase  of the second dimension: p The economic and environin connectivity should be seen as p a scenario that has  mental dimension provides an excellent basis for  winners on both sides, a scenario that can help to  mutually beneficial cooperation among the particiRCVOPI\u00025VCVGUq\u0104\u0002VJG\u0002 chairmCPUJORoU  programme states.  With reference to the previous chairs, its optimistic    interim assessment was that the p concept of econom53 p More Economic and Environmental Cooperation for More Secu- ic connectivity has set us on the path to address these  TOV[\u0002OP\u0002GPTQRGq\u0010\u00021RGPOPI\u0002#\u0143\u0143TGUU\u0002M[\u0002FO\u0143OGT\u0002$PT\u00d3JCNVGT\u0104\u0002%JCOTRGTUQP in-Office of the OSCE, 22nd OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum,  Prague 10 September 2014, EEF.DEL\/37\/14 (10 September 2014),  www.osce.org\/whoweare\/123396?download=true (accessed  20 August 2019).  54  Heidi Grau, p The 2014 Swiss OSCE Chairmanship: Between p 4QPVOPGq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p %TOUOUq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 OSCE Yearbook 2014, ed. IFSH  57  Keynote Speech by the Special Representative for the German  (Baden-Baden, 2015), 25V S40 (26ff.).  OSCE Chairmanship 2016 Dr. Gernot Erler at the 24th OSCE Econom55 (TQO\u0002VJG\u0002)GTOCP\u0002RGTURGNVOXG\u0104\u0002pUPUVCOPCMNG\u0002NQPPGNVOXO\u000f ic and Environmental Forum in Prague (14 September 2016),  V[q\u0002NQORTOUGU\u0002MGVVGT\u0002RJ[UONCN\u0002CP\u0143\u0002XOTVPCN\u0002OPVGTNQPPGNVG\u0143PGUU\u0104\u0002 https:\/\/www.auswaertiges-amt.de\/en\/newsroom\/news\/160914for instance increased customs cooperation, cross-border  erler-eef\/283390 (accessed 16 April 2019).  transport infrastructure, or aligning investment conditions,  58  Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the opencf. German government, Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust,  ing of the business conference organised by the German OSCE Chairrestoring security. The priorities of the German OSCE Chairmanship OCPUJOR\u0002p%QPPGNVOXOV[\u0002HQT\u0002%QOOGTNG\u0002CP\u0143\u0002+PXGUVOGPVq\u0002  18 May  in 2016 (Berlin, 2016), 9. However, there is no binding OSCE  2016), https:\/\/www.auswaertiges-amt.de\/en\/newsroom\/news\/definition of the term p connectivityq .  \/280726 (accessed 12 September 2019).  56  OSCE, Report by the 2016 German OSCE Chairmanship,  59  OSCE, Ministerial Council, Decision No. 4\/16. Strengthening  CIO.GAL\/219\/16 (23 December 2016), 84V 86,  Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity, MC.DEC\/4\/16  http:\/\/www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/307311?download=true  (9 December 2016), www.osce.org\/cio\/289316?download=true  (accessed 16 April 2019).  (accessed 16 April 2019).  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  18     The Activation of the Second Dimension and the Role of Chairmanships since 2014  increasing divisionsq .60 The 2017 OSCE Ministerial  international standards in these areas, as the Italian  Council in Vienna, however, only agreed on a resolu- representative promised in his closing speech at the  tion to promote economic participation; another  first preparatory meeting of the EEF in 2018.63  resolution, on cooperation on environmental matters,  In 2019, Slovakia has chaired the OSCE. It, too,  did not find consensus.   promised to maintain programmatic continuity with  The Italian chairmanship also gave its own im- its predecessors. In the second dimension, the focus  petus to the economic and environmental dimension  initiated by Italy on digitisation has been maintained,  with a focus on the topics of digitisation and human  linked to energy cooperation, good (environmental)  capital development in the digital age. Like the pre- governance and connectivity.64 Nevertheless, in the  vious chairmanships, the Italian government adhered  context of the continuing crisis of European security,  to the OSCE troika concept, i.e. to the rule of co-ordi- a certain disillusionment with the bridge-building  nating the current chairmanshipoU\u0002 work programme  potential of the second dimension already seems to  with the RTG\u0143GNGUUQToU\u0002CP\u0143\u0002UPNNGUUQToU\u0002CIGP\u0143CU . Con- be settling in. In his inaugural address, the Slovak  sequently, Italy also highlighted interfaces with the  Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office,  priorities of connectivity and economic participation.  IOTQUNCX\u0002.CL\u00ea\u00bd\u00d3\u0104\u0002GORJCUOU ed that he was deliberately  The Italian chairmanship similarly justified the  avoiding another general call for cooperation, as  choice of topics by explaining that discussion of these  these had too often remained unanswered. Instead,  issues and the search for common solutions to com- he advocated more realism.65  mon challenges offered an opportunity to renew trust  between participating states. It is precisely the economic and environmental dimension, the programme  states, which offers a framework for agreement on  p common and less conflicting interestsq .61 At the  Ministerial Council in Milan in December 2018, a  decision on p* uman Capital Development in the  Digital Eraq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002C\u0002\u0143GNNCTCVOQP\u0002QP\u0002VJG\u0002 pF igital EconoO[q\u0002YGTG\u0002C\u0143QRVG\u0143\u0010 62 Italy, like Germany in 2016,  could thus claim to have developed a new term for  the OSCE and anchored it in corresponding resolutions. But the OSCE is far from a platform for setting    60  Programme of the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship for Presentation to Participating States, 2017, 3, www.osce.org\/cio\/  293066?download=true; see also: Welcoming Remarks by  Dr. Hans J\u00f6rg Schelling, Minister of Finance, Austria, 25th OSCE  Economic and Environmental Forum, EEF.DEL\/42\/17 (Prague, 6  September 2017), www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/  338081?download=true; Opening Address by Deputy Foreign  Minister Michael Linhart, First Preparatory Meeting of the 25th OSCE    GNQPQOON\u0002CP\u0143\u0002GPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002(QTPO\u0002p)TGGPOPI\u0002VJG\u0002GNQPQO[\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 63  p Closing Statement by Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson  $PON\u0143OPI\u00022CTVPGTUJORU\u0002HQT\u00025GNPTOV[q\u0002 (23 January 2017),  of the OSCE Permanent Council, First Preparatory Meeting  http:\/\/bit.ly\/2lUsBLF (all accessed 20 August 2019).  of the 26th GNQPQOON\u0002CP\u0143\u0002GPXOTQPOGPVCN\u0002(QTPOq\u0104\u0002 61  Dialogue, Ownership, Responsibility. Programme of the Italian EEF.DEL\/17\/18 (Vienna, 24 January 2018),  OSCE Chairmanship 2018 (January 2018),  www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/367711?download=true (acwww.esteri.it\/mae\/resource\/doc\/2018\/01\/prog-osce-100118- cessed 17 April 2019).  d.pdf (accessed 17 April 2019).  64  Accordingly, the title of the 2019 EEF cycle is p Promot62 OSCE, Ministerial Council, Decision No. 5\/18. Human Capi- ing Economic Progress and Security in the OSCE Area  tal Development in the Digital Era, MC.DEC\/5\/18 (Milan, 7 Decem- through Energy Cooperation, New Technologies, Good Govber 2018), www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/405899?down  erPCPNG\u0002CP\u0143\u0002%QPPGNVOXOV[\u0002OP\u0002VJG\u0002FOIOVCN\u0002GTCq\u0010   load=true; idem., Declaration on the Digital Economy as a Driver  65  q5VCVGOGPV\u0002M[\u0002VJG\u0002%JCOTRGTUQP\u0002OP\u00021HHONG\u0002*\u0010  E. Miroslav  for Promoting Cooperation, Security and Growth, MC.DOC\/2\/18  .CL\u00ea\u00bd\u00d3\u0010\u00022TGUGPVCVOQP\u0002QH\u0002 PrioriVOGUq\u0104\u0002%+1\u0010)#.B3B08\u0002 8OGPPC\u0104\u0002 (Milan, 7 December 2018), www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/  10 January 2019), www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/408602?  405920?download=true (both accessed 17 April 2019).  download=true (accessed 19 April 2019).    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    19   Cooperation, Trust, Security: The Academic Debate  Cooperation,  T rust,  S ecurity :   T he  Academic D ebate   5NQXC\u00d3OCoU  realism regarding the conflict-solving  be successful.67 In fact, in a globalised interdependent  potential of cooperation in the second dimension ad- world, cooperation is more the rule than the excepdresses a fundamental point: the connection between  tion68 V  without any obligation or need to see that  cooperation, trust and security V  as assumed by  cooperation as an expression of trust between the  the bridge-builder metaphor that is often used with  actors.  respect to the second dimension V  is as blurred as  What is meant by trust influences the answer to  the OSCEoU  core concepts of cooperative and com- the question of whether trust also (inevitably and  prehensive security. The academic debate on the  sustainably) means a higher degree of security, and  subject reflects this.66  whether and how trust can be actively brought about  through specific measures. Here, the distinction in  the English-language debate on trust in international  Cost - B enefit  C alculation vs.  S ocial  Bonds   relations is very illuminating. It differentiates between trust on the one hand and confidence (occasionalProponents of a revival of the second dimension  ly also reliance), on the other. Confidence describes the  argue that cooperation in seemingly less contentious  result of strategic calculation(s), while trust at the very  areas, such as the economy and the environment,  least additionally emphasises a social relationship  can be a means of building trust, which is in turn a  linked to positive emotions and mutual goodwill,  con dition for creating more security and stability in  which is ultimately based on a common identity, and  Europe. However, this causal chain is by no means  shared values and ideas.69 Although the existence of  borne out by the academic literature, especially in its  general applicability. From a rationalist perspective,    cooperation can also be entered into for purely (or  67  Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, p Trusting  primarily) strategic reasons. Whether or not coopera- 4GNCVOQPUJORU\u0002OP\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00022QNOVONUE\u00020Q\u00020GG\u0143\u0002VQ\u0002*G\u0143IGq\u0104\u0002 tion occurs is therefore a question of interests and  Review of International Studies 40, no. 4 (2014): 753V 70; Jonaincentives, and dependent on the assessment whether  than Mercer, p Rationality and Psychology in International  it will pay off against the background of an individu- 2QNOVONUq\u0104\u0002 International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 2005):  al cost-benefit calculation. Referring to the second  77V 106; Aaron M. Hoffman, p A Conceptualization of Trust  dimension as a potential framework for win-win  OP\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00024GNCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002 European Journal of International  situations is based more on such an understanding.  Relations 8, no. 3 (2002): 375V 401.  Under these circumstances, however, cooperation is  68  The current debate on the implementation of economic  sanctions as an extraordinary means of foreign policy undernot proof that the relationship between the actors  lines this point.  involved is characterised by trust, or that it generates  69  Clara Weinhardt, p Relational Trust in International  trust. At best, it is an indication of the confidence of  Cooperation: The Case of North-5QPVJ\u00026TC\u0143G\u00020GIQVOCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002 those involved that their respective calculations will  Journal of Trust Research 5, no. 1 (2015) (Special Issue: Trust in  International Relations V  A Useful Tool?): 27V 54 (32V 34);  Christopher Andrejis Berzins differentiates two components  QH\u0002VTPUV\u0104\u0002pTOU\u00d3\u0002OCPCIGOGPVq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002pTGNCVOQPUJOR\u0002OCPCIGOGPVqE     Christopher Andrejis Berzins, The Puzzle of Trust in International  66  Laura Considine, pn $CN\u00d3\u0002VQ\u0002VJG\u00024QPIJ\u0002)TQPP\u0143 o\u0002#\u0002)TCO - Relations: Risk and Relationship Management in the Organisation for  mCVONCN\u0002#RRTQCNJ\u0002VQ\u00026TPUV\u0002CP\u0143\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00024GNCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002 Security and Cooperation in Europe, PhD Thesis, London School  Millennium 44, no. 1 (2015): 109V 27 (110).  of Economics (London, 2004).  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  20     p5RONNQXGTq\u0002MGVYGGP\u0002FOOGPUOQPU\u0002QT\u0002+PNTGCUOPI\u00025GRCTCVOQP!   this (genuine) kind of trust is accompanied by lower  logical, that a 2017 OSCE decision in the economic  threat perception on the part of the actors involved V   and environmental dimension first posits peace, good  and thus ultimately with a higher level of security V   international relations, security and stability as pNTP it is also much more difficult to achieve.70  cial for the creation of a climate of confidenceq\u0002 and  then, almost in the next paragraph, posits economic  How the process that leads from  cooperation as a motor for stability and security. In  increased cooperation to trust and  one scenario, security and stability are at the beginfinally to increased security actually  ning of the causal chain; in the other, at the end.73  works is not delineated.   In fact, there are still many questions to be an- p 5RONNQXGTq\u0002MGVYGGP\u0002FOOGPUOQPU\u0002QT   swered on the interrelationships of trust, inter- I ncreasing  Separation ?   governmental cooperation and international security.  Notwithstanding this, trust-building is often (simplis- Just as the success of trust-building measures is not a  tically) equated with increased cooperation or gener- foregone conclusion, neither is the effect of cooperaally accepted as its result. How the process leading, or  tion and trust generated in a specific policy field on  supposedly leading, from increased cooperation to  other fields.74 The assumption that there are such  trust and finally to increased security actually works  positive spillover effects testifies to a functionalist  is not often delineated. The expectations attached  understanding of cooperation as developed very speto such an undifferentiated understanding of trust-  cifically to explain the progress of European interespectively confidence-building measures are there- gration in the mid-20th century. Detached from the  fore often exaggerated. The fact that a wide variety of  specific case above, the hypothesis underpinning this  measures and policies are nevertheless increasingly  thinking could be formulated as follows: cooperation  labelled as such seems to express hope rather than  in areas with better chances of success V  i.e. less  reliable findings.71  contentious issues, where there is an intersection of  In OSCE statements and writings as well, there are  common interests, or supposedly less politicized or  few indications as to how exactly trust and ultimately  securitised (welfare) issues (p NQY\u0002RQNOVONUq\u000b\u0002 V  has a  security can be generated through cooperation in  positive effect on other areas with greater conflicts  economic and environmental spheres. Yet elsewhere  of interest or with more entrenched issues (p high  (as in the concept of cooperative security) it is as- RQNOVONUq\u000b\u0010 75 However, how this can be achieved is  sumed that cooperation presupposes a minimum  not clear. There is no automatic link between p low  degree of trust, although it is not clear what this  RQNOVONUq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 p JOIJ\u0002RQNOVONUq\u0104\u0002 by which changes in one  minimum trust should be based on.72 Against this  area result in changes in the other, or make them  background, it may not be a contradiction, but rather  absolutely inevitable. Without sufficient interrelationships or dependencies between fields or topics,    without a favourable political environment and a  70  Torsten Michel, p Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Re- corresponding will on the part of actors, decoupling  flecVOQPU\u0002QP\u0002VJG\u0002%QPNGRV\u0002QH\u00026TPUV\u0002OP\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00024GNCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002 European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 4 (2013):  869V 90 (873, 880); Berzins, The Puzzle of Trust (see note 69),  18.  71  An example of a sceptical assessment of what trust- or    confidence-building measures can achieve specifically in the 73  OSCE, Ministerial Council, Decision No. 8\/17. Promoting  CSCE\/OSCE context is Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking  Economic Participation in the OSCE Area, MC.DEC\/8\/17\/Corr.1  Confidence-Building Measures. Obstacles to Agreement and the Risks (Vienna, 8 December 2017),  of Overselling the Process, Adelphi Paper 307\/1996 (London:  www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/361566?download=true (acInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996); Berzins, cessed 26 April 2019).  The Puzzle of Trust (see note 69), 37V 48.   74  Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Charles Keating, p Going  72  Keating and Wheeler point out that even if a state sends )NQMCNE\u00026TPUV\u00024GUGCTNJ\u0002CP\u0143\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00024GNCVOQPUq\u0104\u0002 Journal  out trust signals, these still do not have to be perceived as  of Trust Research 5, no. 1 (2015): 8V 26.  such by the addressee. Instead, they might well be interpret-75  Thomas Gehring, p Integrating Integration Theory: Neoed as weakness or a ruse: Keating and Wheeler, p Concepts  HPPNVOQPCNOUO\u0002CP\u0143\u0002+PVGTPCVOQPCN\u00024GIOOGUq\u0104\u0002 Global Society 10,  CP\u0143\u00022TCNVONGU\u0002QH\u0002%QQRGTCVOXG\u00025GNPTOV[q\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 30), 69.  no. 3 (1996): 225V 53.    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    21   Cooperation, Trust, Security: The Academic Debate  of the areas is just as likely to result as a positive  cooperative practices, depending on the issue at  p NCUNC\u0143G\u0002GHHGNVq\u0010 76  stake.80  Research on security communities also points to  the fact that states make use of quite different, sometimes conflicting, practices in their foreign policy.77  The  15%GoU\u00022 hilosophy  R evisited   Simply because mechanisms based on the balance of  power and those based on a cooperative approach  There is thus much to be said for a conservative  operate alongside each other does not mean that  assessment of the potential of the OSCEoU  economic  there is an inevitable transition from one order to the  and environmental dimension to generate trust and  other. Those involved in the mechanisms may well  spillover across dimensions. Building sustainable  switch between the sets of practices that are charac- trust in a targeted manner is not only difficult in  teristic of both systems of security governance, or  itself: as well as the political will of the actors inmake use of them situatively. For example, practices  volved (which is necessary) the success of such a promay differ functionally and coexist according to  ject also depends on a favourable political context.  specific policies and issues. According to the literature  Otherwise, there is ultimately a risk that measures  on security communities, spillover between policy  conceived as trust-building become p advantageareas therefore cannot necessarily be assumed.78  MPON\u0143OPI\u0002OGCUPTGUq 81 in practice. Moreover, a look at  the past shows that the limits and barriers to positive  Spillover from one dimension to  spillover across the dimensions were already being  another is not automatic.   discussed V  and critically examined V  at the time of  the CSCE. Ultimately, according to commentators at  For the OSCE, this means that there is no automat- the time, the difficulty of generating positive spillover  ic positive spillover from one dimension to another  was also inherent in the concept of the CSCE itself:  and no automatic constructive influence of coopera- more precisely, in the inherent tension between  tion in economic and environmental matters on  cooperative relations on the one hand and military  cooperation in military and human aspects of secu- security on the other. As explained above, the comrity.79 When we consider that the willingness to  plexity of the CSCE (and also of the subsequent OSCE)  cooperate may just as well be based exclusively on  lies in the fact that two different understandings of  national interests and cost-benefit calculations, rather  international order coexist within it: (1) a competitive  than primarily on deep-rooted positive trusting rela- understanding expressed in the military dimension,  tions, it becomes clear that these considerations may  and (2) a cooperative understanding of the intervary greatly by subject and actor. It could therefore  national order ascribing common interests to states.82  be precisely in the interest of a given participating  state not to bind the dimensions of the OSCE and its  specific contents closely; or it could be its foreign    policy strategy to make use of both power-based and  80  For example, Elena Kropatcheva observes in her analysis  QH\u00024PUUOCoU\u0002CNVOQPU\u0002OP\u0002VJG\u00021TICPOUCVOQP\u0002C n approach of p comRGPUCVQT[\u0002NQQRGTCVOQPq\u0002OP\u0002NGTVCOP\u000215%G\u0002CTGCU\u0002VJCV\u0002NGCXGU\u0002 76  Terms such as p spill-CTQPP\u0143q\u0002QT\u0002 p spill-MCN\u00d3q\u0002OP\u0002VJG\u0002CNC - open as many options as possible for Moscow: Elena Kropademic debate signal criticism of the inevitability of spillover tcheva, p Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Secuassumed in earlier functionalist approaches, Arne Niemann,  rity: A n (QTPOo\u0002HQT\u0002FOCNQIPG\u0002QT\u0002C\u0002 n $CVVNGHOGN\u0143o\u0002QH\u0002+PVGTGUVU!q\u0104\u0002 p 0GQHPPNVOQPCNOUO\u0002CP\u0143\u0002G7\u0002+PVGTPCN\u00025GNPTOV[\u0002%QQRGTCVOQPq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 European Security 21, no. 3 (2012): 370V 94.  Theorizing Internal Security Cooperation in the European Union, ed.  81  Mastny, The Helsinki Process (see note 22), 19. On the  Raphael Bossong and Mark Rhinard (Oxford, 2016), 129V 52.  potentially negative impact of confidence-building measures,  77  Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, p When Security  see also Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures (see  Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional note 71).  IGNJCPOUOU\u0002QH\u00025GNPTOV[\u0002)QXGTPCPNGq\u0104\u0002 Review of International  82  Antola, p 6JG\u0002%5%G\u0002CU\u0002C\u0002%QNNCMQTCVOXG\u00021T\u0143GTq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 Studies 35 (2009): 59V 84.  30), 47V 48, 50. Theresa Callan formulates it somewhat dif78 Ibid., 80.  ferently, referring to a p credibility gap between the reality of  79  Earlier analyses already pointed out the lack of integra-UVCVG\u0002OPVGTGUVU\u0002CP\u0143\u0002VJG\u0002TJGVQTON\u0002QH\u0002=VJG\u000215%GoU?\u0002CTNJOVGNVPTCN\u0002 tion of the economic and environmental dimension into the RNCPUqE\u00026J eresa Callan, p9QT\u0143\u0002)COGU\u0002CP\u0143\u00029CT -Games:  work of the other dimensions: see, e.g. Evers, Balancing by  The OSCE and its Quest for n %QORTGJGPUOXG\u00025GNPTOV[oq\u0104\u00022CRGT\u0002 Cross-Linking (see note 51).  presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, 26-31 March 1999  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  22     6JG\u000215%GoU\u00022JONQUQRJ[\u00024GXOUOVG\u0143   The conclusion drawn at that time on the question  of whether these opposing patterns of thought and  action could ever be reconciled in political practice  was sobering: the different logics of p NQQRGTCVOQPq\u0002 and (military) p UGNPTOV[q\u0002 were found to be difficult to  bridge. We might add that, beyond the difference  between cooperative and power-based practices, the  concept of security itself is sometimes interpreted  differently in the three dimensions. Security in the  form of stability for collective actors (states) can also  mean security at the level of the individual, but not  necessarily. Instead of security as stability (sometimes  achieved through the application of coercion, monitoring, and the restriction of basic rights), an understanding of security as emancipation can be applied  at the individual level V  for example, in the sense of  reducing structural disadvantage.83    (Mannheim, 31 March 1999), 13. See also Baylis, p European  5GNPTOV[q\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 33).  83  Ali Bilgic, p Security through Trust-building in the EuroMediterranean Cooperation: Two Perspectives for the PartnerUJORq\u0104\u0002 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10, no. 4 (2010):  457V 73; see also Jo\u00e3o Nunes, p Reclaiming the Political:  GOCPNORCVOQP\u0002CP\u0143\u0002%TOVOSPG\u0002OP\u00025GNPTOV[\u00025VP\u0143OGUq\u0104\u0002 Security  Dialogue 43, no. 4 (2012): 345V 61.    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    23   $GVYGGP\u0002p9OP -9OPq\u0002#UUPORVOQPU\u0002CP\u0143\u0002p0Q\u0002$PUOPGUU\u0002CU\u00027UPCNq   Between  p9 in - W in q   A ssump tions and  p0 o  B usiness as  U sual q   It is not only the statement of the Slovak Chairperson- Differences between participating states, which can  in-Office that reveals a certain scepticism about the  be fundamental, manifest themselves at the latest  envisaged positive effects of calls for cooperation.  when the above-mentioned main subject areas, such  Although in recent years four different EU members  as connectivity or digitalisation, are put in concrete  (Germany, Austria, Italy, Slovakia) have pursued the  terms.87 Russia, for example, is quite open to strengthrevitalisation of the second dimension, there are quite  ening the second dimension,88 and particularly since  different views within the EU on the extent to which  2016 has tried to give the OSCE a role in exploring  economic and environmental issues should be tackled  possible cooperation between the EU and the Russianin order to build trust, and what significance the  dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), under  second dimension should actually have within the  the heading of p NQPPGNVOXOV[q\u0010 89 Conversely, there is  OSCE.84 For example, the Nordic countries tend to  the minimal consensus among the EU member states  believe that there should be no p MPUOPGUU\u0002CU\u0002PUPCNq\u0002OP\u0002 that cooperation between the EU and EAEU should  view of the still unresolved conflict in and around  be limited to individual or purely technical aspects.  Ukraine.85 Outside the circle of EU member states, the  The USA, for its part, strongly rejects the OSCE as a  USA and Canada take a similar stance within the  mediation forum for the p OPVGITCVOQP\u0002QH\u0002OPVGITCVOQPUq   OSCE. They emphasise that dealing with (supposedly)  propagated by Russia. It refers to Moscow or Brussels  less controversial issues such as economic connectivity or digitisation should not come at the expense of    established p 15%G\u0002NQTG\u0002OUUPGUq\u001d\u0002PGOVJGT\u0002 should coop- PC.DEL\/1618\/16 (24 November 2016),  eration on these issues obscure the fact that some  www.osce.org\/pc\/285286?download=true (accessed  participating states disregard key OSCE principles and  17 April 2019).  obligations by, among other things, violating human  87  Thematic preferences and specific approaches are  rights and depriving their citizens of basic freedoms.86  reflected, among other things, in the national statements in  the Permanent Council, e.g. in the meetings reserved for second dimension matters. This chapter is based on an analysis  84  2CTVONORCVOPI\u0002UVCVGUo\u0002\u0143OHHGTOPI\u0002CUUGUUOGPVU\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u0002UOIPOHO\u000f of statements accessible online from the last 10 years.  cance of the second dimension are more of a constant than  88  Moscow, for example, advocates a financial shift towards  an expression of recent developments, see Evers, Balancing by  the economic and environmental dimension: savings in the  Cross-Linking (see note 51), 4, 12.  third dimension should benefit the first and second dimen85 The Nordic countries in particular also ensure that  sions. This attitude, though, is above all an expression of its  engagement in the second dimension does not come at the  dissatisfaction with third-dimension activities. See, e.g.,  expense of the human dimension of security. See also  4PUUOCoU\u00025VCVGOGPV\u0002QP\u0002VJG\u00021C07\u0002$P\u0143IGV\u0104\u000215%G\u0104\u00022GTOCPGPV\u0002 Jannicke Fiskvik, Nordic Security: Moving towards NATO? CSS  Council, Decision No. 1288 (see note 10). Zagorski points out  Analyses in Security Policy 189\/2016 (Zurich: CSS,  that QP\u0002OCP[\u0002GNQPQOON\u0002OUUPGU\u0002IQUNQYoU\u0002UVCVGOGPVU , in fact,  April 2016), https:\/\/ethz.ch\/content\/dam\/ethz\/special- directly address the EU, Andrei Zagorski, p Russia V  Controinterest\/gess\/cis\/center-for-securities-studies\/pdfs\/CSSAnalyse- XGTUOCN\u00022GTNGRVOQPq\u0104\u0002OP\u0002 Perceptions of the OSCE in Europe and the  189-EN.pdf (accessed 19 August 2019).  USA, ed. Alexandra Dienes and Reinhard Krumm (Vienna,  86  United States Mission to the OSCE, Response to the OSCE  2018), 83V 88.  Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities,  89  See also Evers, In Retrospect (see note 11), 14V 17.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  24     Insecurity\/Security in the Second Dimension  V  but not Vienna V  as places where such a debate  of security should be (i.e. p insecurity\/security for  may be held.  whom or for YJCVq ).  Moreover, methodological differences can be  Even the main areas of work that EU states have  seen in approaching the tasks of the economic and  specified when acting as OSCE chairs in recent years,  environmental dimension. The USA, for example,  such as digitisation, connectivity or the green econlinks its priorities in the second dimension (good  omy, do not necessarily have a security reference V   governance, combating corruption, and combating  or evince even a clearly identifiable threat situation.  organised crime) with the issue of democracy\/democ- Rather, these issues can be associated with global  ratisation, and insists on the need to involve civil  risks, such as corruption, terrorism or climate change.  society actors in dealing with the issues they raise.  The containment of these risks usually requires comThis links the priorities to the subject matter of the  mon p RTGXGPVOQPq\u0002QT\u0002NQQT\u0143OPCVG\u0143\u0002 p manaIGOGPVq\u0104\u0002 human dimension. The EU also frequently calls for  rather than addressing actual opponents, which is  p multi-UVC\u00d3GJQN\u0143GTq\u0002CRRTQCNJGU\u0002YOVJOP\u0002VJG\u0002UGNQP\u0143\u0002 simply not possible due to the RJGPQOGPCoU\u0002 crossdimension and thus for the involvement of civil  border and diffuse nature. Moreover, in contrast to  society actors, including media representatives. In  dealing with traditional threats, p NQPPVGTOGCUPTGUq   recent years, however, the participation of non- here often do not target an (external) source, but are  governmental organisations in OSCE events, and the  directed inwards as a precaution, at strengthening  selection of legitimate or accepted interest groups,  resilience.92  has developed into an area of conflict within the  OSCE and between participating states V  albeit not  There is a risk that conflicting  yet with explicit reference to the economic and  interests on issues such as smart  environmental dimension.90  cities and e - governance will not be  clearly identified.   Insecurity\/ S ecurity in the  Second  In addition to the risks or p challengesq\u0104\u0002\u0143GMCVGU\u0002 D imension   in the second dimension often highlight the general  opportunities offered by new technologies. These  Participating states differ not only in how they link  include e-governance as an opportunity to strengthen  second-dimension issues to human-dimension ones,  transparency and fair competition; industrialisation  but also to the first dimension and thus to security  4.0 as an opportunity for economic growth; and smart  aspects in the narrower sense. To avoid duplicating  cities as an opportunity for sustainable urban develthe activities of other international organisations  opment.93 Those experts within and representatives  with an economic and environmental focus, the EU  of delegations to the OSCE who wish to use coopera(as its official statements in the Permanent Council  tion in the economic and environmental fields as a  also advocate) is keen to concentrate on security- starting point for further cooperation, in the context  related issues in the second dimension. In doing so, it  of the current challenges for European security, welis simply striving for what has already been described  come these topics. At the same time, there is a danger  in various resolutions as the core task of the OSCE in  that the conflicting interests and sometimes conflictthe second dimension.91 Yet participating states still  ing objectives (e.g. the possibility of using smart city  dispute which topics are relevant for the OSCE from  technology as a monitoring instrument) also existing  this perspective; how explicit the aspect or impact of    insecurity\/security should be; and what the referent  92  This p RTGXGPVOQPq\u0002RQVGPVOCNN[\u0002CNUQ\u0002 includes control and  monitoring systems, which could ultimately lead to a restriction of fundamental freedoms, a central issue in the third    dimension, see Olaf Corry, p Securitisation and n 4OU\u00d3OHONCVOQPoE\u0002 90  Helsinki Commission, In Brief. Non-Governmental Participa- Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate CJCPIGq\u0104\u0002 tion in the OSCE (Washington, D.C., 19 December 2017),  Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40, no. 2 (2012):  http:\/\/www.csce.gov\/sites\/helsinkicommission.house.gov\/files\/ 235V 58; see also Jan Pospisil, p Resilienz: Die NeukonfiguraReport%20-%20NGO%20Participation%20-%20Final.pdf VOQP\u0002XQP\u00025ONJGTJGOVURQNOVO\u00d3\u0002OO\u0002KGOVCNVGT\u0002XQP\u00024OUO\u00d3Qq\u0104\u0002 \u00d6sterrei (accessed 17 April 2019).  chische Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Politikwissenschaft 42, no. 1 (2013): 25V 42.  91  See the above section on the development and institu-93  They were the subject of various thematic meetings  tionalisation of the economic and environmental dimension.  under the Italian Chairmanship in 2018.    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    25   $GVYGGP\u0002p9OP -9OPq\u0002#UUPORVOQPU\u0002CP\u0143\u0002p0Q\u0002$PUOPGUU\u0002CU\u00027UPCNq   between participating states in these areas will not  OSCE decisions from previous years. This sometimes  be clearly identified, thus reducing the prospect of a  restrictive approach is remarkable in so far as all  productive discussion on these issues.94  decisions taken within the OSCE framework are not,  in any case, legally but merely politically binding,  and their implementation is at the sole discretion of  Vague Intentions to Cooperate   the individual states themselves. The practice of  attaching interpretative statements by individual or  The second-dimension resolutions adopted in recent  multiple states to the resolutions of the Ministerial  years by the Ministerial Council show that even with  Councils illustrates how narrow the scope for undersupposedly less conflict-ridden topics in this OSCE  standing and compromise is.97 The resolution texts  field of activity, the willingness to engage in (institu- of other multilateral forums, such as the UN, are fretionalised) cooperation is limited. Concrete declara- quently also formulaic. Nevertheless, the decisions  tions of intent to enter into intergovernmental coop- adopted within the OSCE tend to indicate rather a  eration, in particular one that would require a certain  lack of trust among the signatories, and to cast doubt  openness on the part of participating states as a basis  on their ability to generate this trust.  for generating further trust,95 are practically absent  from the texts. On the contrary, decisions are pervaded by a carefully chosen p UQHVq\u0002NCPIPCIG\u0002VJCV\u0002 avoids, as far as possible, any formulation that could  be interpreted as an actual obligation. In the operational part of the texts, participating states are p encouraged to RTQOQVGq\u0002VJG\u0002 transfer of technology and  knowledge, the importance of international cooperation OU\u0002pTGNQIPOUG\u0143q , the importance of promoting  regional and sub-regional economic cooperation  pCN\u00d3PQYNG\u0143IG\u0143q\u0104\u0002CP\u0143  the participating states pOPXOVG\u0143q   to implement measures with the aid of intergovernmental cooperation, or exchange best practices. Further weakening is provided by fillers such as pPRQP\u0002 VJG\u0002TGSPGUV\u0002QH\u0002RCTVONORCVOPI\u0002UVCVGUq\u0002QT\u0002 p where approRTOCVGq .96 To bridge the sometimes profound divergences between the positions of the OSCE states V   but without really compensating for these differences  V  the drafting of resolution texts is sometimes based  on fragments of already adopted documents from  other forums or other international organisations. In  the second dimension, these are above all agreements  signed within the United Nations, G20, International  Labour Organisation or World Bank, in addition to    94  Christina Garsten and Kerstin Jacobsson, p Post-Political  Regulation: Soft Power and Post-Political Visions in Global  )QXGTPCPNGq\u0104\u0002 Critical Sociology 39, no. 3 (2011): 421V 37.  95  According to Aaron M. Hoffman, for example, the condition for augmenting trust is that states delegate control over  their own interests in certain areas, see Hoffman, p A ConcepVPCNO\\CVOQP\u0002QH\u00026TPUVq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 67), 377. Keating and Ruzicka  link trust with the renunciation of hedging strategies, see  Keating and Ruzicka, p 6TPUVOPI\u00024GNCVOQPUJORUq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 67).  96  See the corresponding decisions in the second dimension, OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension (see    note 37).  97  Ibid, 337.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  26     +PNTGCUG\u0143\u0002%QOOOVOGPVE\u00026JG\u0002p*QYq\u0002+U\u00029JCV\u0002%QPPVU   Making Progress  in the  S econd  D imension :   Some  S uggestions   Given the general difficulty of building sustainable  abandoned. Does this mean that increased involvetrust through cooperation, and the 15%GoU\u0002 specific  ment in economic and environmental issues within  starting position, to what extent can it be hoped that  the OSCE is ultimately misguided? Not necessarily V   a reactivation of the second dimension will fulfil  but the limited room for manoeuvre can and should  expectations? Or are sceptics right to worry that a  be better utilised.98  stronger commitment to cooperation in p NQY\u0002RQNOVONUq\u0002 Sustainable trust, i.e. trust as a social bond, recould even be counterproductive to progress on poli- quires shared values and a common identity. It is  tical-military and, in particular, human aspects of  questionable whether such trust can consciously  security?  be brought about by certain measures. Ultimately,  It is important to note that, from the perspective  however, such bonds are based on communicative  of the chairmanships which have pursued or are pur- practice.99 Without raising expectations, the regular  suing a revitalisation of the second dimension, this  second-dimension meetings do offer Germany and  has not been accompanied by a desire to pay less  other EU members opportunities to promote their  attention to the first and third dimensions. The crisis  values and perspectives, to put forward appropriate  in and around Ukraine and related developments are  arguments, and to share their own best practices  among the most important issues for and within the  with other participating states. This should be widely  OSCE V  especially for the countries whose turn it is  undertaken. Since meetings in the second dimension  to chair it. The OS%GoU\u0002 aim is to help stabilise the  have so far taken place in a comparatively relaxed  situation, prevent further escalation of violence, and  atmosphere, they should have room for this kind of  defuse the explosive potential of security incidents  factual argumentation.100  such as the clash  between Russia and Ukraine in the  The decisions of the Ministerial Councils may well  Sea of Azov in autumn 2018. This is evidenced not  be the most p VCPIOMNGq\u0002RTQ\u0143PNV\u0002QH\u0002VJG\u000215%G o s annual  only by the weekly discussions in the Permanent  cycle. However, the text negotiations that precede  Council, but also by the speeches of foreign ministers  them only take up part of the second half of each  and heads of delegations at the annual Ministerial  year. In the second dimension, the three meetings of  Council, such as in Milan in December 2018 and  the Economic and Environmental Forum, the impleBratislava in December 2019. The countries that have  mentation meeting of the economic and environmenchaired the OSCE since 2014 and sought to revitalise  tal dimension, and numerous other thematic meetthe second dimension did so with the aim of contrib- ings offer a wealth of opportunities for exchange,  uting to overcoming the crisis in European security.  which also but not exclusively feed into the negotiaHere, however, expectation management is the order    of the day.  98  Due to the focus of the present study (see note 21), the  suggestions refer to the interactions of participating states in  Vienna.  Increased Commitment: The  p *QYq\u0002+U\u0002 99  Berzins, The Puzzle of Trust (see note 69), 129ff; Naomi  What Counts   Head, p Transforming Conflict: Trust, Empathy, and DiaNQIPGq\u0104\u0002 International Journal of Peace Studies 17, no. 2 (2012):  The general expectation that any kind of cooperation  33V 55 (35).  within the second dimension has the potential to  100  See Thomas Gehring on the role of p MCTICOPOPIq\u0002CP\u0143\u0002 create (sustainable) trust and spillover should be  pCTIPOPIq\u0002OP\u0002OPVGTPC tional multilateral negotiations, Gehring,  p +PVGITCVOPI\u0002+PVGITCVOQP\u00026JGQT[q\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 75), 238V 41.    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    27   Making Progress in the Second Dimension: Some Suggestions  tion process. On the one hand, there are those who  efficiency. This increase in efficiency, however, also  claim that the mere fact of regularly meeting in  leaves less room for EU positions in the plenary and  Vienna fulfils the postulate of p NQQRGTCVOQPq\u0002 in the  thus less visibility V  time limits for speeches apply  Organisationo s name. On the other hand, the highly  equally to the EU representative. Close and advance  ritualised procedures of these meetings, constantly  coordination between EU colleagues to complement  reproduced in ready-made national statements which  joint EU statements with individual speeches in a  are read out during the sessions, supplant open (fac- national capacity could therefore help to make EU  tual) discussion; these have already been criticised on  positions more prominent. Furthermore, both the  various occasions, not only with regard to the second  joint EU statement and the supplementary national  dimension. Thus far, procedures have only been  comments could be formulated in such a way that  slightly adjusted structurally in response to such  the thematic meetings lead more emphatically than  criticism. Yet this should not prevent Germany from  before to concrete discussions V  and ideally to a  making effective use of the meetings during the  productive contest for superior arguments and policy  entire annual cycle of the second dimension, together  approaches. Necessary expertise can be garnered  with other EU states V  both via contributions from  through close collaboration between respective  delegations and by identifying spokespersons who  specialist departments in Brussels, or (in the case of  contribute their technical expertise.  Germany) at national level in Berlin, and the delegaIn terms of content, these forums should be used  tions in Vienna.  for political dialogue among the participating states  Although their implementation is often sketchy,  on core economic and environmental challenges and  the texts adopted by the Ministerial Council are the  their impact on European security.101 The aim of this  most visible result of a NJCOTOCPUJORoU  activities. As  exchange would be to provide political impetus V   in other multilateral settings, however, in the econoas already agreed upon by participating states with  mic and environmental dimension the struggle for  respect to strengthening the Economic and Environ- formulations is often more concerned with reassuring  mental Forum in 2004. By focusing on the nexus of  all those who expressed concerns or reservations. The  economy, environment and security (not a new  fact that the finished negotiated texts are therefore  demand), second-dimension debates would also tie  often the expression of the lowest common denomiinto the discussion on the (crumbling) basic consen- nator and not the product of persuasion based on  sus with regard to a rule-based European order and  factual arguments does not exclusively apply to the  common principles. This would also strengthen the  OSCE.102 Despite this, Germany, together with other  character of the OSCE as a security organisation in  EU members, should proactively use the drafting  the second dimension. Simultaneously, setting topics  process, including to generate spillover. When  under this premise could counteract the securitisa- negotiating, they should promote the anchoring of  tion of p NQY\u0002RQNOVONUq\u0002V opics from the economic and  references from the first and third dimensions in the  environmental sectors. It is thus possible that contro- final documents. Thus far, second-dimension deciversies will be more strongly expressed in the debate  sions by the Ministerial Council have indeed included  on economic and environmental issues as well, in  references to the involvement of other actors, such as  addition to common ground vis-\u00e0 -vis the perception  representatives of non-governmental organisations or  of challenges and opportunities. However, this should  independent media, and explanations on the impornot be seen as an obstacle; it is the only way to ex- tance of respecting human rights. However, this is not  change these various views.  a matter of course. On the contrary, various particiIt is fitting and important, both externally and  pating states try to avoid precisely such linkages, and  internally, for the countries of the European Union    to speak with one voice within the OSCE and to back  102  Pouliot, p *OGTCTNJ[\u0002OP\u00022TCNVONGq\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 15), 6. Referjoint EU statements. This not only has a signalling  encing J\u00fcrgen Habermas, Jennifer Mitzen also emphasises  effect: EU coordination also contributes to greater  that convincing with arguments presupposes a genuine  willingness on the part of the negotiating actors to work    towards a compromise and adapt their own stances V  a con101 Thus the objective for the then Economic Forum fol- dition that is not necessarily given, Jennifer Mitzen, p Readlowing a 2004 decision (see chapter p Institutionalisation and  ing Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and GloDevelopment of the Economic and Environmental Dimen-MCN\u00022PMNON\u00025RJGTGUq\u0104\u0002 American Political Science Review 99, no. 3  UOQPq\u000b\u0010   (August 2005): 401V 17.  SWP Berlin  Cooperation, Trust, Security?  December 2019  28     +PNTGCUG\u0143\u0002%QOOOVOGPVE\u00026JG\u0002p*QYq\u0002+U\u00029JCV\u0002%QPPVU   thus ultimately decouple the economic and environ- their significance in the second dimension could be  mental dimension from the other two. Yet decoupling  increased.104  could produce counterproductive results with regard  Another way of dovetailing the dimensions to  to possible spillover: the 15%GoU\u0002 principles and obliga- facilitate positive spillover, or at least prevent secondtions could acquire a diffuse character p QP\u0002RCRGTq  as  dimension progress being made at the expense of the  well, enabling participating states to choose between  other two dimensions, would be to provide package  alternative reference points. Second-dimension deci- solutions. These could bind decisions on the economsions, for example, could fall behind those in the  ic and environmental dimension, which are in the  human dimension in their wording and thus under- interest of states with little regard for progress in the  mine the impact of the latter. Overall, this would  third dimension, to progress in the human dimenpromote a p cherry-RON\u00d3OPIq\u0002UVTCVGI[\u0002OP\u0002YJONJ\u0002CNVQTU\u0002 sion. Such an approach, as practised in the early years  commit themselves to formulations of varying reach,  of the CSCE, might not be able to align participating  probably affecting the negotiation of future resolu- UVCVGUo\u0002\u0143OHHGTOPI\u0002 interests, but could possibly reconcile  tions as well. In other words, spillover can be both  them.  positive and negative.103 To avoid negative spillover,  close and continuous exchange with relevant national  and EU colleagues from the other dimensions is vital,  A bbreviations   including if possible during the intensive phase of  negotiations. An EU position agreed beforehand, in- CORE  Centre for OSCE Research (at the Institute for  cluding p TG\u0143\u0002NOPGUq\u0104\u0002UJQPN\u0143\u0002OC\u00d3G\u0002OV\u0002GCUOGT\u0002H or the EU  Peace Research and Security Policy at the  to take an active role in the text negotiations, for  University of Hamburg)  instance as concerns its demand for references to  CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in  Europe  human rights and civil liberties, as well as provide the  CSS  Centre for Security Studies at ETH Zurich  supporting arguments. Such an approach could also  DCAF  Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance  reduce scepticism about a revival of the second dimen- (formerly Geneva Centre for the Democratic  sion on the part of those EU member states that fear  Control of Armed Force)  a dilution of OSCE principles as a result. On the one  EAEU  Eurasian Economic Union  hand, that risk of dilution exists. On the other hand,  EEC  Economic and Environmental Committee  EEF  Economic and Environmental Forum  it is certainly also the case that skilful negotiation can  IFSH  Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at  augment texts with statements of liberal principles,  the University of Hamburg  as happened with the 2018 Declaration on the Digital  NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  Economy, the final version of which contains, inter  OCEEA  Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and  alia, a commitment to free and open access to the  Environmental Activities  ODIHR  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and  Internet.  Human Rights  Furthermore, representatives from Germany and  OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in  EU states could also advocate cross-dimensional  Europe  decisions from the outset. These would then have to    be prepared in meetings attended by experts in  the    respective dimensions. As already stated in the 2003  Maastricht Strategy, most challenges are de facto  cross-dimensional. This should be reflected in the  way the OSCE works. +P\u0002VJG\u000215%GoU\u0002CPPPCN\u0002N[NNG\u0002V wo  meetings of the committees are meant to be crossdimensional in any case. Where applicable, these  meetings could be used more strategically, including    with a view to adopting decisions or declarations; and  104  This is in line with current calls for dovetailing the  dimensions more closely, calls that have also repeatedly    been put forward in the debate on second-dimension reform.  103  Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen, p A Strategic  Thus far, however, the almost ten-year-old statement that  6JGQT[\u0002QH\u00024GIOOG\u0002+PVGITCVOQP\u0002CP\u0143\u00025GRCTCVOQPq\u0104\u0002 International  p there is no overall OSCE approach to acting cross-dimenOrganization 66, no. 4 (2012): 645V 77 (646); Gehring, p Inte- UOQPCNN[q\u0002UVONN\u0002UGGOU\u0002VQ\u0002MG\u0002XCNO\u0143\u0104\u0002UGG\u0002GXGTU\u0104\u0002 Balancing by CrossITCVOPI\u0002+PVGITCVOQP\u00026JGQT[q\u0002 UGG\u0002PQVG\u0002 75), 248.  Linking (see note 51), 14.    SWP Berlin    Cooperation, Trust, Security?    December 2019    29                         ","related_references":[{"view":". (n.d.). See also: International Peace Institute, Economic Connectivity. A Basis for Rebuilding Stability and Confidence in Europe?. Vienna:.","pdf_url":""},{"view":"<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1163\/1571814054740724\" target=\"_blank\">Fonblanque, J. (2005). Strengthening the Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE (EED)\". Helsinki Moni- tor, 16(3).<\/a> ","pdf_url":""},{"view":"<a href=\"\/publication\/csa-pais-2006-0308490\" target=\"_blank\">G. (2005). The OSCE between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life, DCAF Policy Paper 10\/2005. Geneva: DCAF.<\/a> ","pdf_url":""},{"view":"Bjorvatn, T. (2014). The OSCE's Economic and Environmental Dimension: Enhancing Relevance and Impact, Nordem Thematic Paper Series. Oslo: University of Oslo, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights.","pdf_url":""}]},"system_type":"BASE","doc_rank":1,"rid":29029824}]}}